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The primary purpose of this Article is to review the historical de-
velopment and present status of Missouri's Merchandising Practices Act,
Chapter 407, and the recent court decisions that have arisen under the Act
or otherwise have an impact thereon. Special emphasis will be given to the
expanding role of the Attorney General to enforce the Act, and recent sta-
tutory enactments that will serve to more effectively combat consumer fraud
in Missouri.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the State of Missouri grew from one based on agriculture and a
bucolic life to one of modern urbanization, the marketplace changed as well.
As the marketplace grew dramatically in size, it became increasingly imper-
sonal. Goods were produced in one part of the country, packaged in another,
and consumed in yet another. As the marketplace became impersonal, the
level of knowledge and trust a consumer had in his merchant was not nearly
as attainable as before. In an international marketplace, the consumer was
unable to protect himself from merchandising fraud and had to rely more
1
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upon government regulation for protection. The United States Chamber of
Commerce estimates that consumers annually lose 5.5 billion dollars to white-
collar fraud and deceptive trade practices.' It found that there is "more crime
committed against consumers every day than there is crime in the streets.
The public is constantly being fleeced. . . . "2 The federal government was
the first to perceive a need for consumer protection legislation and enacted
the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. 3 This act, however, was primarily
concerned with encouraging competition in the business arena.4 It was not
until the Wheeler-Lee Amendment in 1938 that consumer-oriented protection
became a concern of the government. 5 The Wheeler-Lee Amendment enlarged
the statutory mandate under section 5 of the Act by declaring "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices" unlawful. 6 No longer was it necessary to show
1. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE U.S., A HANDBOOK ON WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 6 (1974). This dollar figure relates only to the loss of consumer victims to
consumer fraud, illegal competition, and deceptive practices. The estimate by the
Chamber of Commerce concerning total annual dollar loss of "some" white-collar
crimes was estimated to be 47.78 billion. Id.
2. Id. at 25. The Chamber of Commerce further noted that "consumers are
not the only losers. Responsibly run companies lose sales and market share to those
firms which rely on deception and fraud. And the loss of confidence in business
resultant from consumer fraud hits the ethical as well as the unethical firm." Id.
Thus the effect of active enforcement action with stringent and broad "anti-fraud"
laws is the protection of not only the consumer but the honest entrepreneur.
3. Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 41-51 (1982)).
4. Id. Section 5 of the 1914 statute reads:
Unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
The commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations except banks, and common carriers subject to
the Acts to regulate commerce, from using unfair methods of competition
in commerce.
Whenever the commission shall have reason to believe that any such
person, partnership or corporation has been or is using any unfair method
of competition in commerce, and if it shall appear to the commission that
a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public,
it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a
complaint stating its charges in that respect, and containing a notice of a
hearing upon a day and at a place therein fixed at least thirty days after the
service of said complaint. ...
Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1982)).
5. Wheeler-Lee amendment, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. Ill (1938) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)). "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." Id. (emphasis
added).
6. The [Wheeler-Lee] amendment added the phrase "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" to the section's original ban on "unfair methods of com-
petition" and thus made it clear that Congress, through section 5, charged
the FTC with protecting consumers as well as competitors. The House Report
on the amendment summarized congressional thinking: "[T]his amendment
makes the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of
[Vol. 52
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injury to competition. Prior government attempts to regulate the marketplace
had been concerned solely with the businessman; only recently have the
interests and protection of the consumer been championed by government.
Pursuant to the Wheeler-Lee Amendment, a considerable body of federal
jurisprudence arose defining the contours of consumer fraud. 7
Nevertheless, after the 1930s the idea of government protection of the
consumer waned until the late 1950s and early 1960s when the states began
to pick up the slack left by the federal government.8 The federal government's
role in regulation was slowly de-emphasized. While virtually all states are
interested in the elimination of white-collar fraud, each has its own focus
and emphasis.
Until 1967, a Missouri citizen who had been victimized by fraud in a
consumer transaction had available only the private legal remedies embodied
in the common law of Missouri, his own initiative in implementing those
remedies and, of course, his financial ability to do so. The private legal
action available to the consumer was inadequate. The consumer's private
action at common law for fraud in Missouri required that he overcome
serious legal obstacles and burdens in order for him to be successful. Under
Missouri's common law, fraud was never presumed but had to be established
from the evidence with the burden resting upon the one alleging it.9 Missouri
courts delineated nine distinct elements of the offense, each involving a ques-
tion of fact that had to be proved. Those elements included: 1) a represen-
tation; 2) its falsity; 3) its materiality; 4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity
or ignorance of the truth; 5) the speaker's intent that it should be acted upon
by the hearer in a manner reasonably contemplated; 6) the hearer's ignorance
of its falsity; 7) his reliance on its truth; 8) his right to rely thereon; and, 9)
his consequent and approximate injury.10 The general rule in Missouri was
that fraud had to relate to representations of present or pre-existing facts,
and could not be predicated upon representations of matters or things to be
done in the future."
equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured
by the unfair methods of a dishonest competition."
F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (citations omitted).
7. Literally hundreds of federal cases delineating consumer fraud have arisen
on the subject. See cases annotated at 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (West 1973 & Supp.
1986).
8. Missouri enacted its Merchandising Practices Act in 1967. The first states
to begin their own deceptive trade practice enforcement were New York and Rhode
Island in 1957, followed by Washington and Alaska in 1961. For more background
in that period, see P. CROWN, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE CONSUMER (1963).
9. Hardwicke v. Hamilton, 121 Mo. 465, 26 S.W. 342 (1894); Lowther v.
Hays, 225 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1950).
10. Yerington v. Riss, 374 S.W.2d 52 (Mo. 1964); Powers v. Shore, 363 Mo.
59, 248 S.W.2d 1 (1952) (en banc); Williams v. Miller Pontiac Co., 409 S:W.2d 275
(Mo. Ct. App. 1966).
11. Yerington, 374 S.W.2d at 58.
1987]
3
Webster et al.: Webster: Combatting Consumer Fraud in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
If the amount involved in the transaction was small, a consumer was
left without an effective recourse or remedy for the alleged consumer fraud.
Concomitantly, the Missouri consumer was left with little hope for protection
against similar injuries or occurrences in the future.
The year 1967 heralded a new era for Missouri consumers. In that year
the Missouri General Assembly enacted the state's Merchandising Practices
Act, Chapter 407, a modest and laconic bill that nonetheless chipped away
at the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor.12 This modest initial effort by the
legislature to protect the consumer grew noticeably in 1973 and dramatically
in 1985 and 1986. In its present form, the Merchandising Practices Act stands
as one of the most effective and all-encompassing consumer protection laws
passed by a state.
As it now exists, the Merchandising Practices Act embraces within one
agency, the Attorney General's office, the authority to proceed administra-
tively, civilly, or criminally against a "person" engaged in consumer fraud.
The balance of this Article will focus upon Missouri's evolving Mer-
chandising Practices Act and recent court decisions affecting the Act. First,
the major component parts of the original 1967 Act will be discussed to
establish a foundation to aid in understanding the subsequent amendments
and case law. Secondly, the more significant amendments to the Act passed
in 1973, 1985, and 1986 will be highlighted. Finally, certain cases that have
arisen under or impacted upon the Act will be identified and briefly analyzed.
II. THE 1967 MERCHANDISING PRACTICES ACT
The original Merchandising Practices Act of 1967 contained only four-
teen sections. 3 These included section 407.010-definitions; section 407.020-
unlawful merchandising practices defined and exemptions from the coverage
12. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 407.010-.130 (Supp. 1967). Author's note: footnote
citations will be to the volume where the section being discussed was first published
in the Missouri Revised Statutes and may not be the citation to where the statute is
presently found. Textual citations regarding specific sections of the Merchandising
Practices Act are designed to be a quick reference to the specific statute under dis-
cussion by applicable year.
13. This form of legislation, called the Consumer Fraud Acts, differs from
the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law developed by the Federal
Trade Commission in conjunction with the committee on Suggested State Legislation
of the Council of State Governments. For a discussion of the development and
composition of the three alternative versions of the model act, see NATIONAL CON-
SUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTIcEs 4-5 (1982). As
noted therein, Missouri and six other states have enacted a version somewhat different
than the three alternative models developed by the Federal Trade Commission. It
may be assumed that the legislature enacted the Consumer Frauds Act, rather than
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of the Act; section 407.030-assurances of voluntary compliances for vio-
lation of the Act; section 407.040-civil investigative demand authority and
procedures; section 407.050-procedures for producing materials demanded
by a civil investigative demand; section 407.060-confidentiality of docu-
ments produced pursuant to a civil investigative demand; section 407.070-
procedure to extend return date of a civil investigative demand; section
407.080-penalties for noncompliance with a civil investigative demand; sec-
tion 407.090-legal remedies to compel compliance with a civil investigative
demand; section 407.100-injunctive relief for certain violations of the Act;
section 407.110-penalties for violation of injunctions; section 407.120-
saving clause for other remedies outside of the Act; and finally, section
407.130-Attorney General's recovery of cost for litigation under the Act.
Certain statutory provisions are merely procedural and are self-explanatory,
and have not been subject to amendment, and as such will not be discussed
in depth in the body of this article. The substantive provisions, however,
will be discussed anon regarding their content and evolution.
The triggering section, or "subject matter jurisdiction" section, of the
Merchandising Practices Act appears in section 407.020. Although this section
has been subjected to recent "legislative fine tuning" to broaden its scope
and account for decisional law, the initial section in the 1967 version of the
Act stated:
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud,
false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the concealment, suppres-
sion, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely on such
concealment, suppression or omission in connection with the sale or adver-
tisement of any merchandise, is declared to be an unlawful practice .... 14
It is apparent from the reading of this statute that the legislative purpose of
the Merchandising Practices Act was to protect consumers in the marketplace
not only from actively committed fraud (i.e., misrepresentation, deception,
or false promise) but also from passive fraud (i.e., concealment or omissions
of material facts). Clearly this statutory enactment appears to tremendously
reduce the burden of proof that was necessary to prove fraud at common
law. The fact that the courts have interpreted this section to effectuate the
statute's consumer protection philosophy will be discussed in a subsequent
section of this article.'
While certain terms of the Act were clearly defined as to scope and
meaning, the elements or perimeters of the "unlawful practices" of the sec-
tion (i.e., deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation,
or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact) were not.
14. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.020 (Supp. 1967).
15. For a discussion and analysis of leading Missouri cases interpreting section
407.020, see infra text accompanying notes 177-86.
1987]
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Hence, the enforcement actions of the Attorney General and the resulting
appellate decisions have been crucial in determining the type of conduct
prohibited by the Merchandising Practices Act.
The key terms defined by the legislature in the 1967 Act were "adver-
tisement," "merchandise," "person," and "sale." These were defined as
follows:
(1) "Advertisement" includes the attempt by publication, dissemination,
solicitation or circulation to induce directly or indirectly any person to enter
into any obligation or acquire any title or interest in any merchandise;
(2) "Merchandise" includes any objects, wares, goods, commodities,
intangibles, real estate or services;
(3) "Person" includes any natural person or his legal representative,
partnership, corporation (domestic and foreign), company, trust, business
entity or association, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer,
director, member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestui que trust thereof;
(4) "Sale" includes any sale, offer for sale, or attempt to sell mer-
chandise for cash or on credit."6
An analysis of these defined terms clearly indicates that the legislative intent
behind the initial Act was to broadly define the key terms of the Act so as
to provide effective protection for consumers in the marketplace who were
not otherwise protected by existing law. "Person" was defined to include
natural persons as well as all conceivable types of businesses. The definition
of "merchandise" included virtually all types of goods and services, tangible
and intangible. "Advertisement" included all oral or written, "direct or
indirect" inducements to purchases. And finally, "sale" included not only
final sales transactions, but also all "attempts" and offers to sell. These
definitions for the most part have been left intact by the subsequent amend-
ments since their broad and inclusive nature was clearly set forth in the initial
Act. One notable exception to be discussed later is the definition of the term
,,sale.,,17
Although the initial "subject matter" terms of section 407.020 were
expansively defined to reach most all types of mercantile transactions, the
legislature purposefully exempted from the coverage of the Act a few very
limited areas. The legislature excepted the media when there was no knowl-
edge that an advertisement disseminated to the public violated the Act.'$ The
legislature also excepted from the unlawful practices section of Chapter 407
"any advertisement which is subject to and in compliance with the rules and
regulations of and the statutes administered by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. '" 9 This was subsequently deleted by amendment and will be discussed
16. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.010(l)-(4) (Supp. 1967).
17. For a discussion of the legislative intent embodied in amending the def-
inition of "sale" to include leases, see infra text accompanying notes 69, 122-23.
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later.20 Finally, section 407.020, did not apply to any institution or company
under the direction or supervision of the Director of the Division of Savings
and Loan, the Director of the Division of Insurance, or the Commissioner
of Finance, unless the directors of those divisions specifically requested the
Attorney General to implement the powers of the Act.2' The legislature ex-
cluded the advertising media from the unlawful conduct of their advertisers,
except where the media had knowledge of the false, misleading, or deceptive
character of the advertisement so that the sanctions to be imposed for vio-
lations of section 407.020 would properly impinge only upon that class of
irresponsible merchants that shared culpability with the "person" perpetrat-
ing the fraud. Similarly, institutions already subject to regulation and su-
pervision by other state administrative agencies expert in specialized areas
were appropriately left under their jurisdiction unless the directors of those
agencies believed that an entity they regulated had engaged in consumer fraud
which was of a type properly handled by the Attorney General under the
powers granted by the Act. In those instances the directors of the enumerated
administrative agencies could refer the activity uncovered by their investi-
gation to the Attorney General for appropriate action.22
Section 407.030 of the 1967 Act provided that the Attorney General
could, subject to circuit court approval, enter into an Assurance of Voluntary
Compliance "in the administration of sections 407.010 to 407.130" with any
person who he believes has violated these sections. 2 The Assurance of Vol-
untary Compliance is an agreement between the suspected violator and the
Attorney General that the alleged unlawful activities will cease. The person
entering into an Assurance of Voluntary Compliance with the Attorney Gen-
eral does not admit any wrongdoing, but promises to stop whatever specified
activity he allegedly was engaged in and to adhere to the other provisions of
the Act. An inherent weakness in this section (i.e., the unenforceability of
the assurances of voluntary compliance) was corrected by an amendment
discussed below. 24
The next section of the initial 1967 Merchandising Practices Act to be
discussed is section 407.040. This section created and established procedures
for a investigative tool known as the civil investigative demand.
The civil investigative demand is an administrative subpoena that grants
to the Attorney General expansive authority to investigate, prior to litigation,
20. For the rationale, legislative intent, and effect of the deletion of this
exception to section 407.020, see infra text accompanying notes 124-25.
21. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 407.020 (Supp. 1967).
22. Id.
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.030 (Supp. 1967).
24. For a discussion of the 1985 amendment to section 407.030, see infra text
accompanying notes 106-11. For an analysis of the appellate decision which prompted
enactment of the 1985 amendment, see the leading cases section of this article infra
at text accompanying notes 201-15.
1987]
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any suspected violation of the Act. The Attorney General was authorized by
this statute to issue an investigative demand when it appeared that a person
had engaged in or was engaging in any practice declared to be unlawful by
sections 407.010 to 407.130, or when it was in the public interest that an
investigation be made. 25 The original section 407.040 limited the investigative
demand to require the production of documentary material and further pro-
vided that the investigative demand was not applicable to criminal proceed-
ings. 26 These constraints were changed by subsequent amendment. 27 The statute
further required that each investigative demand state the nature of the alleged
violation, 28 the applicable statute, 29 what documentary material was re-
quired,30 a return date within which the documentary material was to be
produced, 3' and to which member of the Attorney General's staff production
was to be made.3 2 This statute also prohibited any request made in an in-
vestigative demand which would be unreasonable or improper if presented
in a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the State of Missouri,3 3 which
would require the disclosure of any privileged documentary material, 34 or
which for any other reason could not be required by a subpoena duces tecum
25. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.040(1) (Supp. 1967).
26. Id.
27. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.045 (Supp. 1985). These constraints embodied in
the original Act were deleted by amendment in 1985; moreover, the legislature en-
visioned the Attorney General's use of the investigative demand in both civil and
criminal proceedings. This legislative intent is found in the 1985 amendment which
states:
In any civil investigative demand served under section 407.040, no individual
shall be permitted to refuse to answer any question material to the matter
in controversy or to refuse to produce documentary material or testify on
the ground that the testimony or documentary material required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to any penalty; but, if such individual
asserts his rights against self-incrimination, he shall not be subject to criminal
prosecution or to any action for a criminal penalty or forfeiture on account
of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may testify or
produce documentary material. To avail himself of this section, such indi-
vidual need only make his assertion of his right against self-incrimination
on the record or known to the Attorney General.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.045 (Supp. 1985). It is clear from the above-quoted enactment
that an investigative demand can now be used in criminal investigations; axiomatically,
if the target of the investigation is an anticipated defendant in a criminal case, all
constitutional safeguards such as those embodied in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), must be observed during all phases of the investigative demand process.
28. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.040(2)(1) (Supp. 1967).
29. Id.
30. Id. at § 407.040(2)(2).
31. Id. at § 407.040(2)(3).
32. Id. at § 407.040(2)(4).
33. Id. at § 407.040(3)(1).
34. Id. at § 407.040(3)(2).
[Vol. 52
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issued by a court of this state. 35 The legislature then prescribed the methods
by which service of the investigative demand could be made.3 6 The legislature
provided in 1967, via section 407.050, that documentary material which is
the subject of an investigative demand issued pursuant to the provisions of
section 407.010 to 407.130 be produced for inspection and copying during
normal business hours at the principal office or place of business of the
person served, or at such other times and places as may be agreed upon by
the person served and the Attorney General.3 7
The 1967 version of section 407.060 required that documents produced
pursuant to a demand under sections 407.010 to 407.130 be kept confidential
by the Attorney General.38 This has been modified by subsequent amend-
ment. 39 Section 407.060 also declared that the Attorney General could use
such documentary material or copies thereof in the enforcement of section
407.010 to section 407.130 in any court, provided that such material which
contains trade secrets shall not be presented except with the approval of the
court in which the action is pending after adequate notice to the person
furnishing such material.- Pursuant to the original section 407.070 the in-
vestigative demand could be challenged by the subject "person" any time
before the return date or within 20 days after the demand had been served,
whichever was shorter.41 The recipient of the investigative demand was re-
quired to show good cause for setting aside the demand or modifying it.42
In order to make the investigative demand a useful tool that was not taken
lightly, section 407.080 of the Act made the failure to comply with such
demand a criminal offense punishable by a fine not to exceed $500 or by
imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or both.43 In addition
to the criminal penalties, section 407.090 allowed the Attorney General to
file a petition seeking a court order that the investigative demand be
honored. 44 Any order so entered was subject to appeal to the supreme court,
and disobedience thereof could be punished as contempt. 45 Most of the in-
35. Id.
36. Id. at § 407.040(4).
37. Id. at § 407.050.
38. Id. at § 407.060.
39. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.060(1) (Supp. 1985) (enacted 1985). The amendment
modified the original requirement of confidentiality to the extent that disclosure may
now be made "to law enforcement agencies of this state, another state or the United
States for enforcement of the laws of such sister state concerning similar acts as
prohibited by this chapter." Id. This allows for reciprocal sharing of information
among law enforcement agencies so that multi-state perpetrators of consumer fraud
may be more effectively prosecuted.
40. Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.060 (Supp. 1967).
41. Id. at § 407.070.
42. Id.
43. Id. at § 407.080.
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vestigative demand procedures and enforcement provisions are in the same
form today as when first enacted in 1967. Hence, no further discussion is
warranted. The injunction provision of the initial section 407.100 granted
the Attorney General the authority to petition the circuit court for an in-
junction prohibiting a person from continuing any practices in violation of
sections 407.010 to 407.130. The original section required that the Attorney
General give three days notice to the proposed defendant of any injunction
action he intended to bring in circuit court, but this constraint was deleted
by a subsequent amendment. 46 The circuit court was authorized to make such
orders or judgments as were necessary to prevent the alleged practice from
continuing or to restore to any person any monies or property, real or per-
sonal, which may have been acquired by means of the statutorily prohibited
unlawful practices4 7 This original injunction section has been drastically
strengthened by subsequent amendments. 48 These amendments shall be dis-
cussed shortly.
The original section 407.110 provided that if a person violated the terms
of an injunction issued under section 407.100, he was subject to a civil penalty
of not more than $5,000 per violation. According to the terms of this section,
the original court issuing the injunction retained jurisdiction for the granting
of penalties. 49
The last two provisions of the 1967 Act of importance are sections
407.120 and 407.130. The former section is a "savings clause" enacted so
as not to defeat other laws that could effectively afford remedies or protection
to consumers in the marketplace. 0 The latter statute provided that the
Attorney General could recover "costs for the use of the state" in his liti-
gation if he could show that the violations were willful." Subsequent amend-
ments to the 1967 Act have greatly broadened the types of monetary orders
that can be granted for enforcing these laws.12
While the 1967 Merchandising Practices Act, in certain respects, con-
stituted the first effective consumer protection law in the state, it was
inadequate in many ways. It failed to address certain types of prevalent
consumer fraud; and further lacked broad, effective enforcement provisions.
46. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.100 (Supp. 1985) (enacted 1985). For a discussion
of the rationale underpinning this legislative deletion, see infra text accompanying
note 92.
47. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.100 (Supp. 1967).
48. The contrast between the original injunction section (407.100) and its
expansion by amendments is highlighted infra in text accompanying notes 65-67, 92-
99, I11.
49. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 407.110 (Supp. 1967).
50. Id. at § 407.120.
51. Id. at § 407.130.
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By subsequent amendments and case law, these legislative gaps have been
closed. The first amendments to be discussed were enacted in 1973.11
53. Although the 1973 amendments to the Act constitute the Act's first sig-
nificant expansion, in 1969 and 1971 a few statutory changes were made that merit
mentioning. Moreover, between 1971 and 1985 several amendments occurred that are
not addressed in the text of this article. While these amendments and enactments do
not warrant the devotion of a section of this article to them, a brief discussion is in
order.
The 1969 amendment enacted a section concerning the delivery of unordered
merchandise to consumers. It states:
Where unsolicited merchandise is delivered to a person for whom it is in-
tended, such person has a right to refuse to accept delivery of this mer-
chandise or he may deem it to be a gift and use it or dispose of it in any
manner without any obligation to the sender.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.200 (1969). Since this statutory language is unusually plain
and clear, no further explanation of its meaning is required.
In 1971, the legislature added four sections to the Merchandising Practices Act.
Two sections relate to gun purchases in contiguous states. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 407.500,
.505 (Supp. 1971). The other sections mandate keeping records concerning the sale
of used copper wire, id. at § 407.300, and for used bronze cemetery vases and
receptacles, id. at § 407.305. These statutes are unrelated to the remainder of the Act
and probably were placed in the Act merely because their subject matter was a type
of merchandise. Since no case law has developed under these sections, no further
analysis is warranted.
In 1974, the legislature amended the Merchandising Practices Act to include a
new section entitled "Pyramid Sales Schemes." While this section also includes certain
provisions applicable to franchises, this discussion will be limited to three sections
dealing with unlawful pyramid sales schemes. A pyramid sales scheme:
includes any plan or operation for the sale or distribution of goods, services
or other property wherein a person for a consideration acquires the oppor-
tunity to receive a pecuniary benefit, which is not primarily contingent on
the volume or quantity of goods, services, or other property sold or dis-
tributed or to be sold or distributed to persons for purposes of resale to
consumers, and is based upon the inducement of additional persons, by
himself or others, regardless of number, to participate in the same plan or
operation....
Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.400(4) (1974).
Generally speaking, a pyramid sales scheme is an illegal multi-level marketing
program in which people make their profits by bringing more people into the program
who do the same without regard to any quantity of merchandise sold for ultimate
resale to the public. These marketing schemes also terminate with more people losing
money than those making a profit. These schemes are now punishable by criminal
prosecution under Mo. REv. STAT. section 407.420 (1986), and may be enjoined under
the terms of Mo. REv. STAT. section 407.550 (1973). A leading case on this law is
State of Missouri ex rel. Ashcroft v. Wahl, 600 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
In 1980, the legislature enacted the "Motor Vehicle Franchise Practices Act."
Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 407.810 to 407.835 (Supp. 1980). This law requires fair dealing
between the franchisor and franchisee of new motor vehicle franchises. It also creates
private rights and remedies for violations thereof. Again, these statutes were probably
placed by the legislature into the Merchandising Practices Act merely because motor
vehicles are merchandise. Since the law is not otherwise related to the Merchandising
1987]
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III. Ti 1973 AMENDMENTS
Six years subsequent to the passage of the 1967 Act, the first significant
amendments were passed that enlarged the scope of the initial Act by ex-
panding existing provisions and enacting new ones. The major sections that
were broadened include section 407.010-definitions; 54 section 407.040-civil
investigative demands;5 5 and, section 407.100-injunctions. 56 The new sta-
tutory provisions contained in the 1973 amendments included section 407.025-
private civil actions and remedies under the Act;57 section 407.105-appoint-
ment of receivers;58 sections 407.150-407.555-vehicle odometer tampering,5 9
Practices Act, it will not be further discussed in this Article.
The "going-out-of-business" statute was also enacted by our legislature in 1980.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.800 (Supp. 1980). This statute initially provided that any
business in the city of St. Louis, St. Louis County, or Jackson County which ad-
vertises or conducts a going-out-of-business sale, shall first file notice with the At-
torney General. Moreover, the statute provided that the sale must be concluded within
sixty days. Violations of this statute were declared to be a violation of Mo. REv.
STAT. section 407.020 (Supp. 1980), and could be stopped by injunctions under Mo.
Rnv. STAT. section 407.100 (Supp. 1980). This section was amended in 1986 to include
all counties in Missouri. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.800 (1986). The legislative intent
behind this statute was to stop fictitious, perpetual going-out-of-business sales that
defraud the public. By and large this has been accomplished. The legislature in 1982
passed new enactments that required retailers or manufacturers of farm machinery
or equipment to repurchase those items from the retailer upon certain contingencies.
These provisions are contained in Mo. REV. STAT. sections 407.850 to 407.885 (Supp.
1982), but will not be discussed in this Article since they do not concern "consumer
protection."
Two pieces of legislation were enacted in 1984 and engrafted onto the Mer-
chandising Practices Act. The first group of statutes, or "mini-acts" concerns the
creation of rights, remedies and responsibilities between artist and art dealer regarding
fine art. These provisions are Mo. REv. STAT. sections 407.900 to 407.910 (Supp.
1982), and will not be discussed in this Article.
The second enactment in 1984 is what has commonly become known as the
"Lemon law." This "mini-act" is contained in Mo. REv. STAT. sections 407.560 to
407.579 (Supp. 1984). This type of legislation, directed towards providing remedies
to consumers who purchase innately defective new vehicles, could properly be the
topic of a law review article of its own so a detailed analysis will not be provided
here. Suffice it to say that the law requires that a dealer or manufacturer who cannot
correct a defect with a new vehicle that impairs the "use, market value or safety"
of the vehicle after a reasonable number of attempts, must restitute to the consumer
or provide at no cost a comparable replacement vehicle. The statute does, however,
provide certain set off and other defenses for the dealer or manufacturer.
54. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.010 (Supp. 1973).
55. Id. at § 407.040.
56. Id. at § 407.100.
57. Id. at § 407.025.
58. Id. at § 407.105.
59. Id. at §§ 407.510, .515, .520, .525, .530, .535, .540, .545, .550, .555.
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and sections 407.700-407.720-home solicitation sales. 60 One purpose of the
1973 amendments was to primarily define terms that were not defined in the
original Act. The new definitions included "documentary materials," "ex-
amination of documentary materials," and "trade" or "commerce." Each
of these newly defined terms appeared in the important civil investigative
demand section of the 1967 Act, but the terms were not defined at all. These
new definitions made it clear exactly what type of documentation and ma-
terials the Attorney General could compel to be produced and when this can
take place. The new definitions state:
(2) "Documentary material," the original or a copy of any book, re-
cord, report, memorandum, paper, communication, tabulation, map, chart,
photograph, mechanical transcription, or other tangible document or re-
cording, wherever situate;
(3) "Examination of documentary material," the inspection, study, or
copying of such material, and the taking of testimony under oath or ac-
knowledgment in respect of any documentary material or copy thereof;...
(7) "Trade" or "commerce," the advertising, offering for sale, sale,
or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real,
personal, or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value
wherever situate, and includes any trade of commerce directly or indirectly
affecting the people of this state.6'
The next section of the 1967 Act that was substantively amended in 1973 is
the section regarding the issuance and procedures of the civil investigative
demand, section 407.040.
Under the 1967 version of the Act, the Attorney General could issue a
civil investigative demand for "documentary material relevant to the subject
matter of an investigation.' '62 The effectiveness and overall value of the civil
investigative demand was extremely limited by this narrow scope. Not only
was "documentary material" not defined, it was the only type of evidence
that could be sought by a civil investigative demand.
In 1973 the legislature responded to these inadequacies by expanding the
type of evidence for which a civil investigative demand could be issued and
by establishing a new statutory investigative technique. Pursuant to the pro-
visions of the 1973 amendment, in addition to "documentary material,"
"physical evidence" and relevant "information" could also be demanded
from any person who possessed knowledge about the suspected violation.6 3
Moreover, the civil investigative demand under the 1973 amendment was no
longer limited to the production of "cold" documentation. The 1973 amend-
ment vested in the Attorney General the power not only to compel the
60. Id. at §§ 407.700, .705, .710, .715, .720.
61. Id. at § 407.010(2), .010(3), .010(7).
62. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 407.040(2) (Supp. 1967).
63. Mo. RIv. STAT. § 407.040(1) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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production of records but also required a person to "appear and testify"
regarding relevant information to the investigation. 64
As a result of this 1973 amendment, the civil investigative demand has
become the most powerful and effective investigative tool possessed by the
Attorney General to enforce the Merchandising Practices Act.
The final section of the existing 1967 Act that was significantly amended
in 1973 was the statutory mandate that permits the Attorney General to seek
injunctions for conduct that violates the provisions of the Act. The statutory
provisions of the original 1967 Act permitted the Attorney General to seek
injunctive relief from the appropriate court prohibiting the unlawful conduct
or prohibited practice, and further to seek money judgments to provide
restitution to consumers suffering economic loss as a result of the illegal
conduct. 65 In 1973, by the inclusion of an amendment to the injunction
statute, the legislature conferred upon the courts the power to appoint a
receiver to preserve the assets of judgment debtors under the Merchandising
Practices Act. 66 By utilization of the statutory receiver, assets that otherwise
might be wasted or hidden by the defendant can now be preserved for dis-
tribution to consumers that were financially harmed by the fraud. This re-
ceiver power has been further broadened by other amendments discussed
below. 67
In addition to modifying existing sections of the 1967 Merchandising
Practices Act, the legislature in 1973 enacted several new sections to broaden
its scope and afford greater protection to consumers. The new private cause
of action section is the first discussed.
The enforcement authority under the original Merchandising Practices
Act of 1967 was completely vested in the Attorney General. As noted, the
Attorney General could seek injunctions, obtain assurances of voluntary com-
pliance, and recover the cost expended in bringing the enforcement action.
While the Attorney General's role in enforcing the Act has traditionally been
aggressive and expansive, the Attorney General, due to limited resources and
other constraints, cannot actively investigate and litigate every case through-
out the state in which consumer fraud is suspected. The General Assembly
recognized this fact in 1973 and enacted a brand new statutory section, section
407.025 which created a private cause of action under the Merchandising
Practices Act.
The new private cause of action statute addresses two main topics: law-
suits by individual private litigants and class action lawsuits.
The statutory provision creating the private civil lawsuit for individual
litigants is straightforward and has, therefore, provided an effective means
64. Id.
65. Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.100 (Cum. Supp. 1967).
66. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 407.100, .105 (Supp. 1973).
67. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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by which consumers can protect themselves from fraud. The section states:
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for
personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers an ascertainable
loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or em-
ployment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful
by Section 407.020, may bring a private civil action in either the circuit court
of the county in which the seller or lessor resides or in which the transaction
complained of took place, to recover actual damages. The court may, in its
discretion, award punitive damages and may award to the prevailing party
attorney's fees, based on the amount of time reasonably expended, and may
provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper.6 3
Several components of this section are worth mentioning. This "private cause
of action" section concerns the "lease" of "goods and services" in addition
to the sale or purchase. It was not until the 1986 amendments to the Act
that the "leasing" of merchandise clearly fell within the scope of the Act. 69
Further discussion on this appears below. 70 Also worth mentioning is the fact
that "punitive damages" are allowed under the private cause of action statute
of the 1973 Act. This not only serves to monetarily punish violators of the
Act, but also provides incentive for attorneys to take cases they otherwise
might decline because of the small monetary amounts involved.
The second portion of section 407.025 that concerns class actions will
not be discussed here. This section is extremely complex with many technical
obstacles that must be met before a class can be "certified" and an action
can be maintained under the Act.
The next new 1973 statutory section added to the 1967 Act is section
407.105, which establishes the rights, powers, and duties of a receiver ap-
pointed under section 407.100. Under this section the receiver is empowered
to "sue for, collect, receive and take into his possession" virtually all records
and assets acquired by the defendant by the unlawful practices giving rise to
the lawsuit. Moreover, the receiver was empowered, with the approval of the
court, to settle the estate and distribute all of the assets to satisfy both the
consumers' and other creditors' claims.7'
By amendment in 1973, the legislature created the first "mini-act" within
the Merchandising Practices Act. This new mini-act was directed towards
curtailing and punishing the activity of altering the mileage on vehicles by
mechanically rolling back the miles on the odometer. The blatant fraudulent
68. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.025(1) (Supp. 1973).
69. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. Neither "legislative his-
tory" nor existing case law under the Merchandising Practices Act explain why leasing
was covered under the private cause of action section but not under the general "anti-
fraud" provision (Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.020 (1986)) of the Act.
70. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
71. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.105 (Supp. 1973).
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practice of rolling back the mileage on odometers is a widespread and age
old problem. It has recently been estimated many used vehicles being offered
for sale have had their odometers tampered with to show less than actual
mileage2 2 Generally speaking, vehicles with few miles appearing on the odom-
eter command greater prices upon resale. The 1973 "Odometer Act" served
to combat this multimillion dollar fraud by various approaches.
First, under section.407.515 of the law, the "sale or use" of any device
"which causes an odometer to register any miles other than the true mileage
driven" is declared unlawful. Additionally, the practice of disconnecting
odometers, or altering the mileage thereon, was declared unlawful by section
407.520, while the operating of a vehicle with its odometer disconnected or
malfunctioning was likewise declared to be a violation under section 407.525.
To assist in the detection of odometer fraud, the legislature enacted section
407.530 that required the transferrers of a vehicle to attest to the true mileage
of the vehicle or set forth the reasons why this was not possible on the
vehicle's title or other transferring documents.
The 1973 "Odometer Act" contained a variety of provisions to enforce
the mandates of the new law. First, both the conspiracy and the individual
act of violating the provisions of the law were declared to be misdemeanors,
and the second conviction of conspiracy was declared to be a felony. 73 Sec-
72. Odometer tampering is reportedly a standard operating procedure of
many used-car dealers (Consumer Reports Vol. 34 p. 250), who turn back
mileage in the knowledge that high-mileage cars have low sale values. After
a car has traveled 30,000 miles, prices start falling off sharply and beyond
that distance, a two-year-old car loses approximately $10 of value for every
1,000 miles traveled. It is estimated that odometer tampering on used cars
costs consumers one billion dollars a year. Odometer tampering has safety
ramifications as well. For example, a driver of a car with 75,000 miles on
the odometer is more likely to take the mechanical condition of his car for
granted than is the driver of a car that has traveled 25,000 miles. The
National Highway Safety Bureau in 1967 proposed a safety standard re-
quiring tamperproof odometers on all passenger vehicles.
Odometer tampering is technically easy. The favorite technique is called
"picking" (most operators use specially shaped ice picks). The "picker,"
after removing the instrument panel lens or boring through a partition behind
the speedometer, reaches into the odometer drum and manipulates the digits
mechanically, usually only the 10,000th place. The tampering is rarely de-
tectable by a used car shopper. Also, the tamperer can spin the speedometer
cable with a high-speed electric motor to the desired low reading. Spinning
is most commonly used by the amateur, however, because it can take hours
to spin off just a few thousand miles. Disconnecting the speedometer cable
is the simplest way to change the odometer reading. Dealers sometimes
disconnect the speedometer cable on a new car to be used as a demonstrator
or to be driven cross-country to the point of sale.
Odometer Tampering in Used Cars, 5 AM. JuR. PROF. oF FACTS Fraud § 170 (Supp.
1986).
73. Mo. Rv. STAT. §407.540, .555 (Supp. 1973).
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ondly, a private cause of action was created under section 407.545 whereby
the purchaser of a vehicle with an altered odometer could bring litigation to
recover triple damages, or fifteen hundred dollars, whichever was greater,
plus attorney's fees. Also, the law vested in the Attorney General and pros-
ecuting attorneys the authority to bring civil actions for injunctive relief to
prohibit the unlawful practice. 74 Finally, the perpetration of any activity in
violation of the odometer laws could subject a vehicle dealer to revocation
of his state license to sell vehicles, pursuant to the mandate of section 407.555.
While these 1973 odometer laws represented a sound beginning to combat
this persistent fraudulent conduct, subsequent amendments, which will be
discussed later in this Article, greatly bolstered the strength of these laws."1
Another new set of laws, or "mini-act," enacted by the legislature in
1973 as amendments to the Merchandising Practices Act is the "Home So-
licitation Sales Act." These laws are contained in sections 407.700 to 407.720.
These laws basically provide that in certain home solicitations, i.e. door-
to-door sales, the consumer has a three-day period in which to rescind the
purchase contract and receive a refund of his money. The purpose of this
law was to provide the consumer monetary relief in sales situations that
typically involve extreme high pressure sales tactics.
Under section 407.700 "home solicitation sale" is defined as follows:
"Home solicitation sale" means a consumer credit sale of goods, or
services, except the sale of real property or interest therein, or the sale of
personal property which is incident to the sale of real property or interest
therein, in which the seller or a person acting for him engages in a personal
solicitation of the sale at a residence of the buyer and the buyer's agreement
or offer to purchase is there given to the seller or a person acting for him.
It does not include a sale made pursuant to a preexisting revolving charge
account, or a sale made pursuant to prior negotiations between both parties
present at a business establishment at a fixed location where goods or services
are offered or exhibited for sale.7 6
The primary limitations of this statutory definition are that the transaction
must be a credit transaction, only personal property and services are covered,
and the purchase must result from an unsolicited offer. Section 407.705
establishes both the consumer's "right of rescission" and the procedure there-
for. That section mandates that, with certain specified exceptions, the con-
sumer can rescind a home solicitation sale by "midnight of the third business
day7 7 after the day on which the buyer" signs the purchase agreement. 78
74. Id. at § 407.550.
75. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
76. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.700 (Supp. 1973).
77. The term "business day" was not defined in the original 1973 "mini-
act." Due to the repeal of the "Blue Laws" throughout the state and the trend for
businesses to stay open longer and on Saturday, Sunday and holidays, the meaning
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The exceptions from this "right of rescission" are contained in section
407.705 (1973), which provides that:
3. The buyer may not cancel a home solicitation sale if (1) The buyer requests
the seller to provide goods or services without delay because of an emergency;
and (2) The seller in good faith makes a substantial beginning of performance
of the contract before the buyer gives notice of cancellation; and (3) In the
case of goods, the goods cannot be returned to the seller in substantially as
good condition as when received by the buyer. 9
Although these limitations are largely fair and reasonable since unjust en-
richment could accrue to the consumer in their absence, the second provision
has been subject to abuse by door-to-door solicitors. That provision provides
that rescission is not available if the seller has made "a substantial beginning
of performance on the contract" before notice of rescission is given. In
several types of businesses, for example home repair and remodeling, tree
trimming, and pest infestation service, certain less than reputable business
people commence the work, often of shoddy quality, immediately upon the
signing of the contract. By this technique, they avoid the "right of rescission"
by claiming that they made a "substantial beginning" on the contract. Con-
sumers subjected to this unethical procedure do not have adequate time to
check on the reputation of the contractor or price shop to make sure they
are getting a fair deal. Due to the economic harm resulting to many con-
sumers each year from this practice, the General Assembly should consider
amending this statute to close up this loophole in the Home Solicitation Sales
Act.
A few other provisions of this Act warrant mentioning. Section 407.710
provides that the seller of a home solicitation contract must provide the buyer
with written notice in 10-point boldface type of his right to rescind the
contract. Obviously this is important because the statutory right of rescission
would have only limited value unless the consumer was fully apprised of that
right.
The final sections to be mentioned in the Home Solicitation Sales Act
are the sections that establish the rights and duties of the seller and buyer
after the "right of rescission" is exercised. These statutes are section 407.715
and section 407.720.
Under the terms of these sections, the seller must, within ten days of
the contract rescission, return all money received from the buyer and return
of the term "business day" became blurred. In 1986, the legislature addressed this
problem, amending the statute to read, in pertinent part: "the term 'business day'
shall mean any day except Saturday, Sunday, and legal holidays." Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 407.705 (1986).
78. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.705(1) (Supp. 1973).
79. Id. at § 407.705(3).
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the contract with the word "cancelled" stamped on its face. 0 All goods
returned by the buyer must be in the same condition as when given by the
seller.8  Finally, the buyer is under a duty to return any goods received from
the seller subsequent to the rescission.12 Although this "Home Solicitation
Sales Act" contained certain internal flaws, it nonetheless has provided a
level of protection to consumers in an area that was previously void.
While the 1973 amendments to the Merchandising Practices Act were
very signifcant measures directed towards consumer protection, the amend-
ments to the Act enacted in 1985 were the most far reaching and dramatic
up to that point in time. Those amendments are discussed next.
IV. THE 1985 AMmE mNrrs
These amendments were signed into law by the Governor on May 31,
1985, and were designed to accomplish four main goals: first, the anti-fraud
provisions of the Act contained in section 407.020 were enlarged to encom-
pass an additional type of "unlawful practice" and to more clearly specify
the jurisdictional coverage of the Act; next, new enforcement provisions and
remedies were added to the Act; third, new statutory enactments were passed
to respond to certain case developments that had a negative impact on con-
sumer protection in the state; finally, the new "Time-Share Act" was created
to respond to a tremendous number of consumer complaints that the At-
torney General was receiving in this previously unregulated industry.
The otherwise broad scope of section 407.020 was further enhanced in
1985 by changing the term "unfair practice" to "unlawful practice." 3 The
utilization of this term was intended to give Missouri's consumer protection
law the same sweep as found in the Federal Trade Commission Act. 4 The
80. Id. at § 407.716(1).
81. Id. at § 407.715(2).
82. Id. at § 407.710.
83. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 407.020(1) (Supp. 1985).
84. See supra note 5 and infra note 86. The word "unfair" is broader than
and inclusive of the word "deceptive." For example, acts which have been declared
"unfair" for reasons other than "deception" include "commercial bribery." Amer-
ican Distilling Co. v. Wisconsin Liquor Co., 104 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1939); FTC v.
Grand Rapids Varnish Co., 41 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1929). But "commercial bribery"
and case law on that subject do not fully establish the breadth of the term "unfair
practice." A discussion of the scope of this term and its legislative history is found
in FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972). The Sperry Court found
that the FTC, like a court of equity, could consider fairness and public values beyond
those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws:
The Commission has described the factors it considers in determining whether
a practice that is neither in violation of the antitrust laws nor deceptive is
nonetheless unfair: (1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been estab-
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term "unfair practice" has traditionally been used to combat such nebulous
concepts as extreme high pressure sales tactics and unconscionably high prices
as relating to consumer transactions.85 A second significant amendment to
section 407.020 was the declaration that the "unlawful practice" could be
stopped whether it occurred "in or from" Missouri. 86 This section made it
clear that the Attorney General could stop fraudulent tactics originating from
Missouri and impacting upon citizens of other states and also those origi-
nating from other states but defrauding Missouri consumers. If an unscru-
pulous entrepreneur preys upon residents of states other than Missouri but
uses Missouri as his home base, the Attorney General now has specific au-
lished by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words,
it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other
established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, op-
pressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to con-
sumers (or competitors or other businessmen)....
Sperry, at 244 n.5. But see infra note 127 (discussing the FTC's recent position on
the three factor test).
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that Sperry
stands for the proposition "that the FTC had the authority to prohibit conduct that,
although legally proper, was unfair to the public." Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d
287, 292 (7th Cir. 1976).
85. See, e.g., Wilbanks Carpet Specialists, 84 F.T.C. 510 (1974) (high pressure
tactics and inducement of "consumers into signing customer contracts without giving
the consumer sufficient time to consider carefully the purchase, and the terms of the
consequences thereof." Id. at 522); Tri-State Carpets, 84 F.T.C. 1078 (1974) (pres-
suring customers to sign contracts in haste, misleading and unfair selling operations
which are harsh, deliberate and sophisticated, and subjecting to further pressure those
consumers who sign contracts but subsequently desire to cancel); Arthur Murray
Studio, 78 F.T.C. 401 (1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972) (intense, emotional,
and unrelenting sales pressure); Household Sewing Machine Co., 76 F.T.C. 207 (1969)
(deceptive "bait and switch" high pressure sales tactics presented in privacy of con-
sumer's home "where the non-commercial atmosphere may lower resistance to the
sales pitch." Id. at 242-43); Murphy v. McNamara, 27 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 911
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) ("an agreement for the sale of consumer goods entered into
with a consumer having unequal bargaining power and which agreement calls for an
unconscionable purchase price, constitutes an unfair trade practice under CUTPA."
Id. at 920 (footnote omitted)); State v. Ralph Williams' North West Chrysler Plym-
outh, 87 Wash. 2d 298, 553 P.2d 423 (1976) (sale of new and used automobiles at
unconscionably high prices).
86. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 407.020(1) (Supp. 1985).
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the conceal-
ment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others
rely upon such concealment, suppression, or omission, in connection with
the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce in or
from the state of Missouri, is declared to be an unlawful practice. Any act
declared unlawful by this subsection violates this subsection whether com-
mitted before, during or after the sale or advertisement.
[Vol. 52
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thorization to act.8 7 The fact that the operation has its "situs" in Missouri
is a sufficient "nexus" for jurisdiction to attach. Conversely, fraudulent
operations such as "boiler room operations,"" domiciled in sister states but
soliciting in Missouri, now clearly fall under the coverage of the Merchan-
dising Practices Act.
The third amendment to section 407.020 was the inclusion of the phrase
"Any act declared unlawful by this subsection violates this subsection whether
committed before, during or after the sale or advertisement." The original
Act, as well as the pre-1985 amendments, failed to provide any guidance
regarding a nexus between the "unlawful act" and the "sale or advertise-
ment" of the merchandise. The statutory terms merely specified that the
fraud must be "in connection with" the "sale or advertisement." Since the
phrase "in connection with" is nondescript as to scope, and has been subject
to a very narrow definition in security sales violations,89 the new phrase was
necessary to make it clear that the legislature intended to confer jurisdiction
over consumer fraud whether it occurred "before, during or after" the so-
licitation or sales transaction. The second type of amendments enacted in
1985 are those directed at specifically elaborating and expanding on the
enforcement provisions and remedies under the Merchandising Practices Act.
New civil remedies were set forth and strong criminal penalties were also
created by the 1985 amendment.
87. This type of issue, involving a similar factual scenario, was raised in State
ex rel. Ashcroft v. Marketing Unlimited of America, 613 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981), where defendants contended that no cause of action was stated because the
contractual agreements occurred outside the state of Missouri. The appellate court
did not discuss this issue in its opinion. See infra text accompanying notes 180-86.
In order to prevent future litigation of this issue, the legislature enacted the "in or
from" language to indicate clearly that an adequate statutory nexus existed to make
the unlawful conduct, such as that described in the text, actionable in Missouri.
88. A "boiler room operation," as the term is used in the area of consumer
fraud, typically involves an unscrupulous entrepreneur using numerous commissioned
salesmen who solicit unsuspecting consumers nationwide by telephone from a central
location for the purpose of selling a given product. By analogy, judicial definition
of "boiler room operation" in the area of securities solicitation is instructive. For
example, the court in United States v. Sawyer, 759 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir. 1986), defined
the term "boiler room activity" as:
offering to customers securities of certain issuers in large volume by means
of an intensive selling campaign through numerous salesmen by telephone
or direct mail, without regard to the suitability to the needs of the customer,
in such a manner as to induce a hasty decision to buy the security being
offered without disclosure of the material facts about the issuer.
Id. at 1497 n.1.
89. The phrase "in connection with," which in security fraud cases relates to
fraud in the actual sale, has been held to mean that the fraud must touch upon the
sale. Valente v. Pepsi Co., 454 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Del. 1978); Rich v. Touche Ross
& Co., 415 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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In addition to the above mentioned changes to section 407.020, an en-
tirely new subsection was passed by the legislature. This final 1985 amend-
ment to section 407.020 is potentially one of the most important tools ever
created to combat consumer fraud in Missouri. This new amendment is
subsection three, which simply states: "Any person who willfully and know-
ingly violates the provisions of this section with the intent to defraud shall
be guilty of a class D felony." While a handful of other states make the
knowing and willful violation of some provisions of their consumer protec-
tion laws a misdemeanor, 90 Missouri appears to be the only state that
90. See, e.g., MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-411 (1983) (subject to a fine
not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding one year or both); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-14-142(3), -142(4) (1985) (a fine of not more than $2,000 or imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both); NEB. Rv. STAT. § 87-303.08 (1981) (designated
a class III misdemeanor; maximum three months imprisonment or $500 fine or both);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 87.303.09 (1981) (willful violation of the terms of an injunction,
declaratory judgment, or assurance of voluntary compliance is designated a felony
punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment of not more than five
years, or both) [Note: while this criminal penalty is the same as in Missouri, the
difference is that the sanction is applicable in Missouri upon an initial violation of
the Act while in Nebraska there must be a violation of the terms of an existing court
order against the subject activity]; Nnv. REv. STAT. §§ 598.640(3), .640(4) (1985)
(knowingly and willfully engaging in a deceptive trade practice is: a) for the first
offense, a misdemeanor, b) for the second offense, a gross misdemeanor, c) for the
third and all subsequent offenses, imprisonment of not less than one year nor more
than six years or by a fine not more than $5,000, or both) [Note: in Missouri, an
initial violation of the Act is a felony, the similar stringent penal provisions in Nevada
are only applicable upon a third or subsequent offense occurring within ten years of
the initial violation]; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 358-A:6(I), -A:6(II) (1984) (a "natural
person" is guilty of a misdemeanor and "any other person" is guilty of a felony;
the identical penalties are imposed for the violation of terms of an injunction). [One
is left to wonder about the deterrent effect of designating a violation of consumer
protection laws a felony if that increased punishment can only be imposed on legal
entities]; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.26(3) (West Supp. 1986) (any person who inten-
tionally refuses, neglects, or fails to obey any regulation or order made or issued
under Wisconsin's "main" consumer protection law, section 100.20, shall for each
offense be fined not less than $25 nor more than $5,000, or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both).
Although this list is comprehensive it is not intended to be completely inclusive;
rather, for the purposes of this article, the foregoing list provides virtually all of the
states which have enacted criminal sanctions for violations of their consumer pro-
tection laws. The list is insightful in that it establishes that Missouri prescribes a
felony for an initial violation of its consumer protection law. Typically, of the rel-
atively few states that prescribe criminal penalties, they involve modest fines and
terms of imprisonment. As may be seen, most penalties have a maximum impris-
onment of one year and are designated misdemeanors. While a few states make it a
felony to violate the terms of a court order, or to repeatedly violate the specific law,
Missouri achieves more of a deterrent effect with its more stringent law; and, due to
the fact that enhanced punishment sections already exist for the repeat offender, see
Mo. REv. STAT. § 558.016 (Supp. 1984), Missouri discourages repeated violations of
[Vol. 52
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designates an initial violation of its consumer fraud section to be a felony.
When utilized in conjunction with the administrative, injunctive, and other
penal aspects of the Act, this criminal provision should greatly enhance
consumer protection in our state. 91 When the unscrupulous businessman or
promoter is faced with the possibility of a criminal indictment and up to five
years in prison, this presents a deterrent effect much greater than the prospect
of mere misdemeanor prosecutions or substantial civil penalties. In addition
to these criminal penalties, the civil remedies, sanctions, and procedures were
legislatively modified in 1985 to make the Merchandising Practices Act more
workable and effective. First, this Article will discuss the amendments to the
injunction statute, section 407.100, then, the new enactments allowing the
Attorney General to collect monies from violators of the Act to defray all
costs and fund future efforts will be discussed.
The first significant amendment to section 407.100 concerned the dele-
tion of a condition precedent to the Attorney General's seeking injunctive
Chapter 407. It is only appropriate, and in response to the effectiveness of its antitrust
and securities law, that Missouri's Merchandising Practices Act carries with it criminal
penalties similar to those found in this state's antitrust and securities statutes.
A final caveat should be made with regard to the listing herein. The list was
drawn up to show what other states have enacted in regard to criminal penalties for
violations of their "main" consumer protection law. Criminal sanctions for violations
of purely antitrust laws, or other peripheral provisions of a particular state's consumer
protection laws have not been included. In this regard it may be mentioned that since
the 1920s many states have enacted statutes proscribing false advertising and providing
modest criminal penalties (misdemeanors) for a violation thereof. Because these pro-
visions have rarely been enforced they were not included in the list.
With state regulation of consumer fraud now in full blossom, activity under
Missouri's new act has been stimualted. Along with the increase in restitution and
civil penalties collected by Missouri under the Act in recent years, more lawsuits have
been filed and it is this writer's opinion that the new criminal sanctions will provide
a powerful tool to deter and punish any egregious consumer fraud. While it will be
noted later in this article that the federal bankruptcy laws hinder consumer protection
enforcement, in that they can vitiate the effect of awards for civil penalties and
restitution, the consumer fraud artist will find criminal penalties much harder to
avoid.
91. Since "intent to defraud" is a requisite element of a criminal violation
of Mo. REv. STAT. section 407.020 (Supp. 1985), when the Attorney General or local
prosecuting attorneys commence criminal actions under this section they will be re-
quired to meet a heavier burden of proof than would be true of civil enforcement
actions brought under the Act. In 1981, an appellate court decision held that an
intent to defraud need not be shown in a civil case. State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Marketing
Unlimited of Am., 613 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see infra text accompanying
notes 180-81, discussing this case. The capacity to deceive was pivotal for showing a
civil violation of the Act. Marketing Unlimited, at 445. Obviously, the new language
creating the felony for violation of this section is in conflict with the language of the
court in Marketing Unlimited. As such, the judicial ruling in Marketing Unlimited,
and other cases in Missouri regarding mens rea and scienter, may not be applicable
to prosecutions brought under the new criminal provisions.
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relief under the Act. Under both the original Act and the 1973 amendments,
the Attorney General was required to notify the suspected violator of his
intentions to sue "at least three days prior to the institution of [an injunctive
action]." 92 The legislative philosophy of this notice requirement encouraged
prelitigation negotiations, but the net affect was that true con men could
flee the jurisdiction or hide assets prior to the filing of the lawsuit. The
legislature cured this undesirable side effect to the notice requirement by
deleting it as a condition precedent in the 1985 amendments.
The next major change in section 407.100 that occurred via the 1985
amendments concerned a modification of the statutory violation for which
an injunction could be sought. It will be recalled from previous discussion
that the Attorney General's initial injunctive power was confined to "prac-
tices declared to be unlawful by sections 407.010 to 407.130" of the Act.93
While this statutory language was adequate when initially drafted since these
sections encompassed the entire Act, with the enactment of the subsequent
amendments, including the "mini-acts," this became far too narrow a scope
for the Act. The "Unsolicited Merchandise" statute passed in 1969 contained
no enforcement provision whatsoever.94 Moreover, the "Pyramid Sales
Schemes Act" only mandated injunctive relief with no mention made of
restitution or enforcement costs; and the "Odometer Act" was likewise lim-
ited as to remedies.95 In recognition of this limitation, in 1985 the legislature
amended section 407.100 to give the Attorney General the authority to seek
the broad sweeping equitable relief for all "practices declared to be unlawful
by the chapter. "96 As a result, this amendment provided effective enforcement
to all the expansive unlawful conduct enumerated in the broadened Mer-
chandising Practices Act, including the "Unsolicited Merchandise" section,
the Pyramid Sales Schemes Act, and the Odometer Act.
The next major amendment to section 407.100 concerns the awarding
of civil penalties for violations of the Act. This amendment is found in
subsection six, which states:
The court may award to the state a civil penalty of not more than one
thousand dollars per violation; except that, if the person who would be liable
for such penalty shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a violation
resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of pro-
92. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.100 (Supp. 1967 & Supp. 1973).
93. Id.
94. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.200 (1969).
95. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.415 (Supp. 1975) (referring to injunctive relief for
pyramid sales schemes); Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.420 (1986) (providing for criminal
penalties for pyramid scheme activities); Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.550 (Supp. 1973)
(referring to injunctive relief for odometer alteration); Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.555
(1978) (providing for criminal penalties for odometer alterations).
96. Id. at § 407.100(1) (Supp. 1985).
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cedures reasonably adopted to avoid the error, no civil penalties shall be
imposed."
While civil penalties have been allowed under the Act since its inception, the
injunctive provision of this new statutory enactment for the first time created
a civil fine or penalty of up to one thousand dollars per violation of the Act
itself. This provision should serve to help make intentional violations of the
Merchandising Practices Act a money losing venture for the con man. Prior
to passage of the civil fine and criminal sanction sections, the worst thing
that could happen to violators of the Act was that they could be enjoined
and required to pay back their ill-gotten gains to their victims. Now, inten-
tional violations of the Act can result in criminal prosecutions and true out-
of-pocket losses.
Section 407.100 was also amended in 1985 to enumerate, for the first
time, additional types of injunctive or equitable relief that the Attorney
General may seek for violations of the Act. These new provisions, which are
contained in subsection two, state:
In any action under subsection 1 of this section, and pursuant to the
provisions of the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure, the attorny general may
seek and obtain temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions, tem-
porary receivers, and the sequestering of any funds or accounts if the court
finds that funds or property may be hidden or removed from the state or
that such orders or injunctions are otherwise necessary.9'
This new section recognizes the exigent and transient nature often present in
consumer fraud matters. With the new measure of temporary restraining
orders, temporary receivers, and the power to freeze the assets, the Attorney
General is now equipped to stop these frauds and preserve the status quo
until a full trial can be conducted on the merits. The final significant change
to section 407.100 is the new 1985 amendment that made restitution orders
"payable to the state." Since this amendment is discussed in detail later in
this article,9 suffice it here to say that the intent behind this amendment was
to preclude consumer debt resulting from fraud from being discharged in
bankruptcy.
Additional amendments enacted anew in 1985 created further penalties
assessable to violators of the Act. Under the provisions of section 407.130
the Attorney General can collect monies to cover "the cost of the investi-
gation and prosecution" of the violator.10 While the "costs for the use of
the state" were recoverable under the original Act'0 1, this term is not clear
as to its meaning or scope. Now, however, under the new terms it is clear
97. Id. at § 407.100(6).
98. Id. at § 407.100(2).
99. See infra text accompanying notes 232-36.
100. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.130 (Supp. 1985).
101. Id. at § 407.130 (Cum. Supp. 1967).
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that attorneys' fees and investigative expenses are collectible against violators
of the Act.
By statutory amendment in 1985, the legislature created a final type of
penalty by statutorily declaring that the Attorney General could be awarded
an additional amount of money, payable by the violator, equal to ten percent
of the total restitution ordered. 02 This new fund was entitled the "Mer-
chandising Practices Revolving Fund", 03 and the proceeds of that fund are
authorized for use in the "investigation, prosecution and enforcement" of
violations of the Act. 04 This shifts the burden, at least in part, of funding
action under the Act away from the taxpayer to the violators of the Act.
Furthermore, this additional penalty should have a deterrent effect upon
would-be violators of the Act.
Several cases arose after the 1973 amendments to the Act that injured
the consumer protection philosophy of the Merchandising Practices Act. Two
amendments enacted in 1985 were aimed at rectifying the harm of this de-
cisional law. These cases will be discussed in some detail in a subsequent
section of this article, 05 but they will be mentioned here briefly for a full
understanding of the 1985 amendments addressing them.
In 1978, the Attorney General sought civil penalties for violation of an
assurance of voluntary compliance entered into ten years earlier between his
office and a business called European Health Spa. The assurance of voluntary
compliance was entered into pursuant to the terms of section 407.030. That
section does not specifically relate to civil penalties but does state: "Matters
thus closed may at any time be reopened by the attorney general for further
proceedings in the public interest pursuant to section 407.110." 106 Section
407.110 established that violations of injunctions could be punished by a
penalty of "not more than five thousand dollars per violation."0 7 The At-
torney General opined in the enforcement action against European Health
Spa that the cross-referencing between sections 407.030 and 407.110 repre-
sented a legislative intent to provide civil penalties for violations of an as-
surance of voluntary compliance. The appellate court disagreed and held that
these statutes do not establish such penalties, nor was it the legislature's
intent to do so. The net affect of this ruling was to make assurances of
voluntary compliance meaningless since their violations were not punishable.
In 1985, the legislature responded to this case through the enactment of
subsection two of section 407.030. That subsection states:
102. Id. at § 407.130(3) (Supp. 1985).
103. Id. at § 407.140(1).
104. Id. at § 407.140(2).
105. See the leading cases section of this article for a discussion of all cases
impacting Chapter 407.
106. Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.130 (Supp. 1973).
107. Id. at § 407.110.
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Any person who violates the terms of a voluntary assurance of com-
pliance entered into under subsection 1 of this section shall forfeit and pay
to the state a civil penalty of not more than two thousand dollars per
violation. For the purposes of this subsection, the circuit court of a county
approving a voluntary assurance of compliance shall retain jurisdiction, and
the attorney general acting in the name of the state may petition for recovery
of civil penalties under this subsection.103
Although the Attorney General has not been compelled to seek penalties
under this new provision for violations of an assurance of voluntary com-
pliance, the legislative intent is now unmistakable: such violation can be
punished by civil penalties up to two thousand dollars per violation. A second
case, discussed in detail infra,'09 that hampered enforcement of the Mer-
chandising Practices Act, thus prompting a legislative response, is the federal
bankruptcy case of In re Cannon."0
In this action the Attorney General sought summarily to intervene in a
federal bankruptcy proceeding and claim nondischargeability on behalf of
consumers who were named in an injunction to receive restitution from the
party petitioning for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court disallowed the At-
torney General's effort by holding that he lacked standing because he was
not a "creditor" under the bankruptcy code in that monies were not owed
to him.
The legislature, via subsection 4 of section 407.100, responded by con-
ferring a type of creditor status upon the Attorney General's injunctive ac-
tions. The subsection simply states:
The court, in its discretion, may enter an order of restitution, payable to
the state, as may be necessary to restore to any person who has suffered an
ascertainable loss .... II
The legislative intent behind the phrase making restitution "payable to the
state" is to create "creditor" status in the Attorney General so that he can
attempt to enforce his injunctions even in the face of a bankruptcy by the
party enjoined.
A capstone to the 1985 amendments in the consumer protection area
was the enactment of the "Time-Share Act." The Attorney General has in
recent years experienced a large increase in the number of complaints relating
to the promotion and sale of recreational time-share interests., 2 As an ex-
108. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 407.030(2) (Supp. 1985).
109. See infra text accompanying note 232.
110. In re Cannon, 741 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1984).
111. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.100(4) (Supp. 1985).
112. Computerized records maintained by the Attorney General reveal that the
Attorney General received the following number of time-share related complaints:
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panding industry, the development, promotion, and sale of time-share in-
terests resulted in abuses, misrepresentations, and high-pressure sales tactics.
A deep consumer concern with the extravagant, hyperbolic promotional lit-
erature and pressuring sales tactics is manifest in sections 407.600 to 407.630.
A major part of this new legislation, patterned after similar statutes in other
states," 3 deals with the regulation of advertisements by resorts which utilize
sweepstakes, gift awards, or othertypes of promotional devices. So long as
the seller utilizes free offers, gift enterprises, drawings, sweepstakes, or dis-
counts as a promotional program to lure consumers to tour his resort, the
Missouri Attorney General must receive a copy of the original promotional
program material used in connection with the sale of the time-share property
not less than 14 days prior to its release to the public." 4 Within ten days
thereafter, the Attorney General is required to make a determination of
approval or disapproval on these promotional devices." 5
Approval by the Attorney General of time-share promotional literature
could not be used as an endorsement of the Attorney General by the seller." 6
No mention of the Attorney General, his review, or his approval can be
utilized in the literature itself.
A minimum of six disclosures must be found in the time-share pro-
motional literature: it must state that it is in connection with the sale of a
time-share interest; it must state the name of each time-share plan or business
entity participating in the promotional program; it must state the day and
year by which all prizes listed or offered will be awarded; it must state the
method by which all prizes are to be awarded; it must state the odds of
winning each prize listed; and it must state the manufacturer's suggested
retail price of each prize." 7
It is important to note that the law requires the Attorney General to
approve or disapprove time-share promotional literature not only upon the
basis of the six enumerated factors, but also with an eye for the standards
set out in section 407.020 to assure the promotional literature is not mis-
leading. " 8 Because the consumer lured to a time-share resort by promotional
literature may be subjected to high pressure sales tactics and end up pur-
chasing property he had no intention of buying before he left home, the new
law provides specific relief for this contingency: the purchaser is provided a
five day "right of rescission" of the time-share contract for any or no reason
113. Much of Missouri's "time-share mini-act" was patterned after Florida
law. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 721 (West Supp. 1986) (especially sections 721.05(1),
(11), (14), (15), (16), (27), (28), (29), (30); 721.06; 721.11; and 721.111).




118. Id. "Approval of materials shall be based on the standards set out in
section 407.020 and this section." Id.
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given." 9 The time-share industry is required to give the consumer written
notice of this right to cancel the contract in 18-point boldface type. The
notice reads as follows:
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO CANCEL THIS AGREEMENT WITHIN
FIVE DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT. CANCEL-
LATION MUST BE IN WRITING AND IF SENT BY MAIL, AD-
DRESSED TO THE OTHER CONTRACTING PARTY AS SHOWN ON
THIS AGREEMENT, CANCELLATION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED AT
THE MOMENT THIS LETTER IS POSTMARKED, IF SENT BY MAIL,
THE LETTER MAY BE CERTIFIED WITH A RETURN RECEIPT RE-
QUESTED. YOUR RIGHT TO CANCEL CANNOT BE WAIVED.-z
The time-share law also regulates exchange programs in depth.' 2' Exchange
programs are the opportunity for and procedure by which the assignment or
exchange of time-share periods among purchasers in the same or other time-
share plans can be effectuated. For the sake of brevity this statute will not
be discussed in this Article. While the amendments enacted in 1985 brought
major reform to the Merchandising Practices Act that greatly enhanced con-
sumer protection in our state, the 1986 amendments were likewise of major
importance.
V. TIE 1986 AMmND1ENTS
The amendments enacted by the legislature in 1986 to the Merchandising
Practices Act fall into the following main topics: the leasing of merchandise
was brought within the mandates of the Act; section 402.020 (1985) as well
as certain other sections were amended to combat charitable solicitation fraud;
the language that required that advertisements comply with the rules and
laws regulated by the Federal Trade Commission was deleted; the Attorney
General was granted criminal prosecution authority; cease and desist au-
thority and rule promulgation authority under the Act were granted; the
"Charitable Organizations and Solicitations Law" was created; and finally,
the criminal penalty for "odometer fraud" was increased to a class D felony.
The triggering activity under the original Act was that there be a "sale, offer
for sale, or attempt to sell merchandise." With the growing "rent-to-own"
industry and expanding popularity of leasing vehicles and household goods,
the legislature deemed it desirable to enact consumer protection legislation
in this area. 22 Their method of doing so was extremely simplistic, and merely
119. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.620 (Supp. 1985).
120. Id.
121. Id. at § 407.625.
122. While the private cause of action section as enacted at Mo. REv. STAT.
section 407.025 (Supp. 1973) statutorily covered the leasing of merchandise, the re-
maining provisions of Chapter 407 creating and vesting enforcement powers in the
Attorney General made no mention of the leasing or renting of merchandise. The
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involved redefining the term "sale" under the Act. The 1986 amendment
defined "sale" as "any sale, lease, offer for sale or lease, or attempt to sell
or lease merchandise for cash or on credit.' 23 This redefinition of a single
term accomplished the legislative purpose of protecting the public from fraud
without the need to create a new "mini-act" on the topic. Functionally, the
lessee of merchandise is afforded the same broad protection under the Mer-
chandising Practices Act as the purchaser. Moreover, the perpetrators of
fraud in the leasing industry are now subjected to the same penalties as
"persons" that commit fraud when advertising or selling merchandise. The
"anti-fraud" provisions of the Act, section 407.020, were again amended in
1986. The main purpose of this 1986 amendment was to declare unlawful
the fraudulent practices in connection with "the solicitation of any funds for
any charitable purpose." With the newly enacted regulatory provisions of
the "Charitable Organizations and Solicitations Law," to be discussed, it
was deemed desirable by the legislature to also specifically declare fraudulent
charitable solicitation to be illegal. This 1986 amendment, in pertinent part,
provides:
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud,
false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the con-
cealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with
the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce or the
solicitation of any funds for any charitable purpose as defined in section
407.453, in or from the state of Missouri, is declared to be an unlawful
practice. 2,
While it seems clear that the initial Act and the subsequent amendments
through 1985 were sufficiently broad to protect the public from fraud if
merchandise was being sold in the charitable solicitation drive, the pure
donations that were solicited and received during such activity probably did
not fall within the coverage of the Act because no offer for sale or actual
sale transpired.'21 Under the 1986 amendments, this possible inadequacy was
succinctly resolved by the addition of the new phrase.
Another amendment passed in 1986 to be briefly discussed concerns the
deletion of an exemption from the coverage of the initial Act. One will recall
that the 1967 Act and all subsequent amendments through 1985 held that
"Any advertisement which is subject to and complies with the rules and
123. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.010(6) (1986).
124. Id. at § 407.020(1).
125. In the various actions brought by the Attorney General against question-
able fundraising activities under the Act, in every instance some type of merchandise,
such as tickets to the circus or a sporting event, or advertising space in a law en-
forcement publication, was being sold with the proceeds purportedly benefiting some
charitable purpose. However, many fundraising drives concern the mere solicitation
of donations with no merchandise being provided and in such a situation the appl-
icability of the Act was in question.
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regulations of and the statutes administered by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion" was exempt from the coverage of the Act. 26 With the evolving nature
of the Federal Trade Commission's enforcement efforts, it was deemed by
the legislature to be inadvisable to continue to have the enforcement scope
and coverage of the Act tied to the whims of a volatile federal agency. 27
126. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.020(2)(2) (Supp. 1985).
127. The Federal Trade Commission's role in consumer protection is currently
not well defined. This is due to the current trend toward federal deregulation and
resource cutbacksaffecting many federal agencies. It is also caused by the Commission
being less active and less predictable in rule promulgation and commencing far fewer
"consumer protection" lawsuits than in earlier years. For these reasons, the Missouri
legislature "untied" the scope of the Merchandising Practices Act from the activities
of the Federal Trade Commission. Even if the Federal Trade Commission finds that
a practice does not violate federal law or has not specifically ruled on the issue, a
state may independently evaluate the conduct in light of the language and scope of
the particular state's own consumer protection law. See Murphy v. McNamara, 36
Conn. Supp. 183, 416 A.2d 170 (1979); Perlman v. Time, Inc., 64 Ill. App. 3d 190,
380 N.E.2d 1040 (1978).
As background for the foregoing, it may be noted that three reports highly
critical of the Federal Trade Commission were published in 1969: AM~iucAN BAR
AssocIATIoN, REPoxT ON -THE ABA COMMIlSSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE CoM-
MISSION (1969); E. Cox, R. FELLMuTH & J. ScHuz, "THE NADAR REPORT" OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969); Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U.
Cu. L. REv. 47 (1969). In the unofficial report of the American Bar Association
Commission to Study the Federal Trade Commission, the view was generally expressed
that not only was the Federal Trade Commission conducting fewer investigations but
that:
for an agency employing over 400 lawyers, and charged with responsibility
for enforcement of statutes in important and developing areas of law, to
initiate a grand total of 23 contested cases in a year is disturbing. With such
an obvious distinction by the FTC to proceed formally, we fear that the
business community may cease to take seriously the guides, rules and other
administrative pronouncements by the FTC, and also may cease to take
seriously the statutes the FTC is empowered to enforce.
AMERicAN BAR Assocr:.noN at 25-26. In response to these criticisms, the FTC allo-
cated greater resources on behalf of "consumer protection" activities. In 1975 the
Congress expanded the jurisdiction of the FTC by passing the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 201, 88
Stat. 2193 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-46, 45-50, 45-52, 45-56, 45-75 a-c, 2301-2312
(1982)). See note, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Cons. Prot. Rep. Serv., section
11:2 (1983), for a more extensive discussion. In 1980 the Congress restricted thejurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission by limiting the Commission's regulatory
power over several industries and giving Congress the power to veto proposed trade
regulation rules. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-46, 50, 57a-1, 57b-l-b-4, 57c, 58
(1982)).
The Federal Trade Commission had used three factors to consider whether a
practice was "unfair." See supra note 84. Recently it announced that the second
factor was duplicative and that the Commission had never relied on it exclusively for
a finding of unfairness; and, in the future the Commission would rely only on the
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An additional amendment enacted in 1986 served to further enhance or
expand the Attorney General's enforcement role under the Act. As will be
recalled, the 1985 amendments made all violations of the Act committed
"with the intent to defraud" a class D felony.1 8 However, the 1985 amend-
ments were silent regarding whose duty it was to commence and prosecute
these criminal cases, so presumably that power was solely vested in local
prosecuting attorneys and circuit attorneys, with the Attorney General only
becoming involved upon request of those local prosecutors. By amendment
in 1986, that prosecutorial limitation was removed. The 1986 statute provides:
It shall be the duty of each prosecuting attorney and circuit attorney
in their respective jurisdictions to commence any criminal actions under this
section, and the attorney general shall have concurrent original jurisdiction
to commence such criminal actions throughout the state where such viola-
tions have occurred. 29
The vesting of the criminal authority concurrently with the Attorney General
is based upon sound reasoning. First, the Attorney General has been en-
forcing the provisions of the Merchandising Practices Act for nearly twenty
years and is familiar with its mechanics and nuances. Secondly, the Attorney
General has traditionally been active in litigating consumer fraud or "white
collar crime" cases, both civil and criminal, in such areas as anti-trust 30 and
securities fraud.' Finally, any given instance of consumer fraud is typically
statewide, and often national, in scope. The Attorney General's presence
throughout the state and his nationwide contacts with peers is very beneficial
in attacking this type of widespread fraud. Thus conferring of criminal au-
thority upon the Attorney General will prove to be an important tool to
curtail economic fraud in Missouri.
other two factors. See Letter of FTC, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50, 421 (Dec. 17,
1980). In March 1982, the National Association of Attorneys General opposed "any
amendments to section 5(a) of the FTCA that would circumcise the scope of consumer
protection statutes at the state level and would undermine the ability of states to
protect their citizens." See National Association of Attorneys General, Resolution
re: FTC Authorization (March 1982).
128. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 407.020(3) (Supp. 1985).
129. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.020(4) (1986).
130. Missouri antitrust law is found at Mo. REv. STAT. Chapter 416 (1978).
Therein, see especially sections: 416.051 (vesting in the Attorney General the authority
to bring criminal prosecutions); 416.061 (vesting in the Attorney General the authority
to bring civil injunctive actions); 416.081 (antitrust revolving fund created for the
office of the Attorney General); 416.091 (civil investigative demand authority vested
in Attorney General); 416.111 (relating to testimony to be given pursuant to an
investigation or proceeding brought to enforce the provisions of sections 416.011 to
416.161).
131. The "Regulation of Securities" law in Missouri is found in Mo. REv.
STAT. Chapter 409 (1978); therein, see especially sections: 409.409 (providing for
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An additional new power was conferred upon the Attorney General by
the amendments enacted in 1986. That is the authority to issue and serve
extra-judicial orders to cease unlawful activities under the Merchandising
Practices Act.
When the Attorney General believes that a person has engaged in, is
engaging in, or is about to engage in any consumer fraud as defined and
delineated in the Act, he may issue a cease and desist order to that person
prohibiting the unlawful practice, provided that he gives notice of his inten-
tion to do so at least two days before he issues the order. 3 2 In that period
of time, the person to whom the cease and desist order is directed shall have
the opportunity to respond to the proposed order. 3 3 Thereafter, the cease
and desist order may be issued and is effective for ten days. 3 4 Service thereof
is to be obtained in the same manner as provided for in the investigative
demand section of the Act. 35 This new enforcement device permits the At-
torney General to stop the prohibited practices expeditiously. He can inten-
sively investigate the matter aided by the issuance of investigative demands,
if necessary, to gather the appropriate documents so that a temporary re-
straining order may be sought within the ten days the cease and desist order
is in effect. Persons who violate the terms of a properly served cease and
desist order are subject to criminal prosecution since such violations are
statutorily deemed to be class D felonies. 36
While the issuance of cease and desist orders is new to Missouri, the
practice has been utilized to some degree by the Federal Trade Commission
and several other states. 37 New Jersey has enacted a cease and desist law
132. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.095(1) (1986).
133. Id.
134. Id. at § 407.095(2).
135. Id.
136. Id. at § 407.095(3).
137. Indeed, the authorization to issue cease and desist orders under a consumer
protection law is infrequently found. The federal statute is cumbersome and without
provisions to allow for the swift issuance of such an order to stop the "quick hitting"
and mobile consumer fraud artist. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(j) (1984). States with more
effective cease and desist authority are:
1) Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 8612(b)(1) (1983). The Division of
Consumer Affairs is authorized to issue cease and desist orders for violations of
Delaware's consumer protection statute, title 6, § 2513. No hearing need be held
before or after the order is issued. The order must be in writing and must state its
basis, but no notice need be given. If the conduct does not cease immediately a
hearing is held to determine whether the violator is to be held in contempt. This is
the most summary cease and desist authority reviewed. The only hearing that need
be held is the one to enforce a violation of the order. Nevertheless, the procedure
outlined has been held to be in compliance with constitutional law when an order
was issued to stop a pyramid chain scheme. See Space Age Prods. v. Gilliam, 488
F. Supp. 775 (D. Del. 1980). The Space Age Prods. court held no "liberty" or
"property" interests under the fourteenth amendment were implicated since the uni-
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similar in substance to, but different in content from Missouri's.' Similarly,
the State of Delaware also has statutory provisions that confer this authority
upon the Attorney General. 3 9
With the recognition of certain constitutional restraints, 14° the cease and
desist order should provide the Attorney General with a new viable and
expeditious device with which to battle consumer fraud in Missouri.
The next amendment to the Act passed in 1986 discussed concerns rule
promulgation under the Merchandising Practices Act. Section 407.145 is an
entirely new section enacted in 1986 that conferred upon the Attorney General
the authority to promulgate rules to carry forth the legislative intent of the
Act. 141 That new statute states:
lateral expectation of profits to be derived from a particular sales scheme does not
rise to the level of a "property" interest and no revocation of a previously granted
license was involved.
2) Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.208 (West Supp. 1986). A cease and desist
order may be issued but a hearing thereon must be held within 30 days and judicial
review is provided for. The order does not become effective until 10 days after all
administrative action is concluded or a final order is made by the judiciary if an
appeal is taken. Florida provides a civil penalty of up to $5,000 for the violation of
an effective order. Florida's provision may be contrasted with Missouri's in that, in
Missouri, a cease and desist order can become effective in two days and the penalty
for its violation is designated a Class D felony.
3) Maryland: MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 13-403 (1983). An order is preceded
by charges upon which a hearing is held within 10 days. Thereafter an order may
issue. If a violator does not comply with an order, the state may proceed with
enforcement thereof. There does not appear to be any real deterrent to Maryland's
law since only the otherwise available remedies are provided if it is not complied
with.
4) New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-18 (West Supp. 1986). This section
provides that the Attorney General may issue a cease and desist order after a hearing
when he finds "that an unlawful practice has been or may be committed." Violations
of the order entail penalties up to $25,000. This statute appears very effective and is
quite similar to Missouri's. While a violation of a cease and desist order is a felony
in Missouri, and not in New Jersey, Missouri's order expires 10 days after it is
effective, whereas there is no such self-termination in the New Jersey law. Both laws
appear to be an effective answer to rapidly unfolding fraud.
138. See supra note 137.
139. See supra note 137.
140. Due process is afforded by the terms of Mo. REv. STAT. section 407.095
(1986). First, the Attorney General is required to provide two days notice to businesses
he intends to issue an order against. Such notice affords the business an opportunity
to be heard before the order is effective. Second, the order statutorily elapses after
10 days. Additionally, the Attorney General is currently drafting rules to further
define the specific procedure for the issuance of a cease and desist order. The rules,
for example, will provide for an immediate hearing and allow for an expeditious
appeal from any adverse holding.
141. Pursuant to this mandate, the Attorney General is currently promulgating
rules for many of the provisions and "mini-acts" contained in the Merchandising
Practices Act. It is anticipated that rule drafting will be concluded and subject to
public comment early in 1987.
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The attorney general shall have the authority to promulgate, in accord-
ance with the provisions of chapter 536, RSMo, all rules necessary to the
administration and enforcement of the provisions of this chapter. Such rules
may include, but need not be limited to, provisions designating the size and
style of type which shall be used in written disclosures required by any
provision of this chapter for which the size and style of type have not been
otherwise designated.14 2
The rules promulgated by the Attorney General under this section are subject
to suspension by the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules if they are
"beyond or contrary" to the Attorney General's promulgation authority or
inconsistent with the legislative intent of the Act. 143
Certain topics that have been the subject of repetitive amendments to
the Merchandising Practices Act could easily fall within the scope of rules
promulgated under the Act. As such, these "fine tuning" or explanatory
changes will no longer burden the legislature but rather can be more expe-
ditiously handled under the rule promulgation authority of the Attorney
General. These rules, once promulgated, should greatly enhance the Attorney
General's efforts in enforcing and interpreting the legislative intent under-
pinning the Merchandising Practices Act.
In 1986, the legislature created an additional "mini-act" within the Mer-
chandising Practices Act. These new statutes are entitled the "Charitable
Organizations and Solicitations Laws."'" The broad legislative philosophy
or intent underlying these new laws is to make detection and effective pros-
ecution of "charitable fraud" possible, while at the same time avoiding "over
regulation" that could be detrimental to bona fide, legitimate charities.
The "Charitable Organizations and Solicitations Law" is divided into
the following main sections: section 407.453 -registration requirement and
exemptions for charitable organizations; section 407.459-the establishment
of a public registration register to be maintained by the Attorney General;
section 407.462-initial and annual registration statement and exemptions of
charitable organizations; section 407.466-professional fundraisers' registra-
tion; section 407.469-annual report requirement of charitable organizations;
section 407.472 -civil investigative demand authority to investigate possible
violations of the "Law," and authorization to enjoin violations under section
407.100.
In order to better understand the scope of the "Charitable Organizations
and Solicitations Law," the definitions of major terms utilized in the pro-
visions of that law will be set forth here. "Charitable organization" is defined
as "any person as defined by section 407.010, who does business in this state
142. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.145(1) (1986).
143. Id. at § 407.145(2).
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or who holds property in this state for any charitable purpose and who
engages in the activity of soliciting funds or donations for, or purported to
be for, any fraternal, benevolent, social, educational, alumni, historical or
other charitable purpose.' 45 A "charitable purpose" is defined as "any
purpose which promotes, or purports to promote, directly or indirectly, the
well-being of the public at large or any number of persons, whether such
well being is in general or limited to certain activities, endeavors or proj-
ects." 46 A "solicitation" is broadly defined as "any request or appeal, either
oral or written, or any endeavor to obtain, seek or plead for funds, property,
financial assistance or other thing of value, including the promise or grant
of any money or property of any kind or value for a charitable purpose.' 
47
Explicitly excluded from the definition of a "solicitation" are unsolicited
contributions unless such are given in conjunction with the solicitation drive. 48
Also excluded from the definition of a "solicitation" are "direct grants or
allocation of funds received or solicited by any affiliated fund-raising or-
ganization by a member agency."' 49 The definition of a "professional fun-
draiser" includes "any person, as defined in section 407.010, who is retained
under contract or otherwise compensated by or on behalf of a charitable
organization primarily for the purpose of soliciting funds."' 50 Excluded from
the definition of a "public fundraiser" is "any bona fide employee of a
charitable organization who receives regular compensation and is not pri-
marily employed for the purpose of soliciting funds."''
Section 407.456 declares it to be unlawful, absent an exemption, for
charitable organizations to solicit funds unless proper registration has been
filed for the organization and its fundraisers. That section states:
no charitable organization may solicit funds in this state, nor employ a
professional fundraiser to solicit funds in this state, for any charitable pur-
pose unless it, and each professional fundraiser employed by it, files all
registrations and reports required by sections 407.450 to 407.478.152
The registration requirement of these sections does not apply to religious
organizations,' 53 educational institutions,' 54 fraternal or other benevolent and
145. Id. at § 407.453(1).
146. Id. at § 407.453(2).
147. Id. at § 407.453(6).
148. Id. at § 407.453(6)(b).
149. Id. at § 407.453(6)(a).
150. Id. at § 407.453(4).
151. Id.
152. Id. at § 407.456(1).
153. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.453(5) (1986). Section 407.453(5) defines "religious
organization" as:
any society, sect, persuasion, mission, church, parish, congregation, temple,
convention or association of any of the foregoing, diocese or presbytery, or
other organization, whether or not incorporated, or any employee thereof,
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social institutions,'55 hospitals and auxiliaries of hospitals,'5 6 matters covered
under the Campaign Finance Disclosure laws, 57 or, organizations which have
obtained an exemption from payment of federal income taxes as provided
by federal law.'58 While these exemptions are quite broad and therefore relieve
many organizations from the registration requirements of the "law," the
type of organizations that are exempted have not typically been perpetrators
of fraud on the public. Section 407.459 of the new "law" requires the At-
torney General to "establish and maintain a register of all documents filed
by charitable organizations in accordance with the provisions of sections
407.450 to 407.478.' ' 59 These records generally are open for public inspec-
no part of the set earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
party or individual associated with such organization, and that otherwise
qualifies as an exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of title 26, United
States Code, as amended, that either:
(a) Meets at more or less regular intervals for worship of a supreme
being or higher power, or for mutual support or edification in piety or with
respect to the idea that a minimum standard of behavior from the standpoint
of overall morality is to be observed; or
(b) Is, including but not limited to, any nursing, boarding, retirement,
children's or orphan's home, or any foundation, commission, hospital, school,
college, university, seminary, or other entity, which is owned, operated,
controlled, supervised or principally supported by, or associated with, through
the sharing of common religious bonds and convictions, any organization
which meets the requirements of [subdivision (5) of this section]....
Id.
154. Mo. Rlv. STAT. § 407.453(3) (1986). Section 407.453(3) defines "educa-
tional institution" as "a school, college or other institution which has a defined
curriculum, student body and faculty, and which conducts classes on a regular ba-
sis .. ."
155. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 407.456(2)(3) (1986). Section 407.456(2)(3) states that
the registration requirement shall not apply to: "Fraternal, benevolent, social, edu-
cational, alumni, and historical organizations, and any auxiliaries associated with any
of such organizations, when solicitation of contributions is confined to the member-
ship of such organizations or auxiliaries. .. ."
156. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.456(2)(4) (1986). Section 407.456(2)(4) states that
the registration requirement shall not apply to: "Hospitals and auxiliaries of hospitals,
provided all fund-raising activities and solicitations of contributions are carried on
by employees of the hospital or members of the auxiliary and not by any professional
fundraiser who is employed as an independent contractor ...."
157. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.456(2)(5) (1986). Section 407.456(2)(5) states that
the registration requirement shall not apply to: "any solicitation for funds governed
by chapter 130, RSMo .... "
158. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.456(2)(6) (1986). Section 407.456(2)(6) states that
the registration requirement shall not apply to: "Any organization that has obtained
an exemption from the payment of federal income taxes as provided in section 501(c)(3)
of title 26, United States Code, as amended, if, in fact, no part of the net earnings
of the organization inure to the benefit of any private party or individual associated
with such organization."
159. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.459 (1986).
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tion. The only exception to the open inspection provision is that the Attorney
General may withhold from public inspection information or documents he
has obtained during an investigation under the Act, or "which otherwise
may be withheld from public inspection by law."'16 This register should serve
to establish a body of information from which the public can acquire in-
formation about certain charities and decide whether it is desirable to donate
to those charities.
Section 407.462 of the new "law" provides that unless otherwise exempt
from the "law,' 6' no charitable organization shall solicit donations or em-
ploy professional fundraisers to solicit donations unless they have filed an
initial registration, under oath, with the Attorney General in a manner in
which he designates. 62 Moreover, certain organizations are also required to
file annual reports.' 6
The annual report shall be sworn to under oath, and shall be in the
form and manner prescribed by the Attorney General. Excepted from the
annual report requirement are charitable organizations which receive money
from an incorporated community chest or the United Fund if the latter two
entities are complying with all provisions of the charitable organizations and
solicitations law. 64 Further excepted from the annual report requirement are
charitable organizations which do not actually raise or receive contributions
in cash, goods, or services valued in excess of the dollar amount established
by the Attorney General by rule, which amount shall not be less than $10,000. 16S
Local affiliates of a statewide or national charitable organization need not
file annual reports if such reports are filed by the state or national organi-
zation. 66
Section 407.466 provides that a professional fundraiser must be regis-
tered with the Attorney General, in the form and manner prescribed by him,
before the professional fundraiser may attempt to solicit on behalf of a
charitable organization. 67 This section will allow the Attorney General to
ascertain the nature and background of any person utilized by a charitable
organization as a fundraiser, and to immediately determine if any person
against whom a complaint is received is so registered. If he is not, of course,
immediate action to enforce the regulations of the consumer protection laws
of Missouri can be effectuated.
160. Id.
161. The same organizations exempt from the requirements of Mo. REV. STAT.
section 407.456 (1986), are also exempt from the initial filing requirements of Mo.
REV. STAT. section 407.462 (1986).
162. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.462 (1986).
163. Id. at § 407.462(2).
164. Id. at § 407.462(2)(1).
165. Id. at § 407.462(2)(2).
166. Id. at § 407.462(2)(3).
167. Id. at § 407.466(1).
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Section 407.469 mandates that all charitable organizations required to
submit an annual report shall, upon request, disclose the percentage of funds
solicited which were spent on the cost of fundraising. 168
Pursuant to section 407.472, the Attorney General is granted the au-
thority to issue investigative demands when he believes that "a person has
engaged in, is engaging in, or is about to engage in any method, use, act or
practice declared to be unlawful by sections 407.450 to 407.478."169 More-
over, under this section, the Attorney General is specifically authorized to
initiate litigation pursuant to the injunctive section 407.100 to enjoin any
activities in violation of the new "law.' 170 All of the provisions of sections
407.100 to 407.140 are applicable to injunctive actions which commence
under subsection 2 of section 407.472.171
As mentioned previously in this article, in addition to enacting the
"Charitable Organizations and Solicitations Law," in 1986 the legislature
also addressed the topic of potential "charitable fraud" in other sections of
the Act. 172 In 1986 the legislature amended section 407.020 to specifically
include as an "unlawful practice" the "employment by any person of any
deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair
practice, or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact
in connection with the solicitation of any funds for any charitable pur-
pose.' ' 7 3 Ergo, criminal prosecutions could be commenced for intentional
"charitable fraud" pursuant to the mandate of subsection 4 of section
407.020.174 With the registration requirements of the new "law" and the
strong criminal and civil remedies created for illegal charitable solicitation,
consumers in Missouri now have real protection from being "ripped-off" by
"charitable fraud."
The final amendment to the Merchandising Practices Act enacted by the
legislature in 1986 concerns the enhancement of the punishment provision of
the odometer fraud provisions of the 1973 Act. 75
Under the terms of the 1973 Act, it was declared to be a misdemeanor
to disconnect, reset, or alter the mileage of a vehicle's odometer with the
intent to defraud.' 76 With the typical monetary loss that is suffered by a
consumer victimized by "odometer fraud" being so great, it was not logical
168. Id. at § 407.469(1).
169. Id. at § 407.472(1).
170. Id. at § 407.472(2).
171. Id.
172. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
173. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.020(1) (1986) (emphasis added).
174. Id. at § 407.020(4).
175. Id. at § 407.555 (Supp. 1973); cf. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.521(3) (1986)
(1986 amendment substitutes "class D felony" for "class B misdemeanor" as clas-
sification for crime of odometer fraud).
176. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 407.520, .555 (1973).
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to punish such conduct as a mere misdemeanor. Hence, by amendment in
1986, the legislature elevated the status of odometer fraud to a class D felony.
In the years to come, this enhanced criminal status of odometer fraud should
prove to have a real deterrent effect upon this persistent consumer problem.
VI. LEADING CASES
Since the passage of the first Merchandising Practices Act in 1967, case
law arising under the Act and collateral to it have served to define the scope
and meaning of the Act. Certain of those leading cases will now be discussed.
While it was clear from the Act itself that the legislative intent behind the
Merchandising Practices Act was to protect the public from consumer fraud,
it was not known whether the courts would strictly construe the Act in
accordance with common fraud principles or broadly construe it under a
lesser burden.
The answer to this question came on April 2, 1973, in the form of an
opinion from the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District, in State
ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge.'7 In that case the Attorney General
sought an injunction against a car dealer upon the basis of three specific
factual scenarios. The allegations concerned the sale of a wrecked automobile
that had been represented by the defendant to be new; the sale of an au-
tomobile which had an odometer reading that did not accurately reflect the
true mileage of the car; and the sale of an automobile which was not in the
condition in which it was represented to be.
Of particular interest is the "Cox transaction" in which Mr. David E.
Cox purchased a Dodge automobile in August 1969. Mr. Cox called the
defendant's place of business in response to a newspaper advertisement and
was shown a 1969 Dodge Monaco which, according to Mr. Cox, was rep-
resented to him as having been driven only by defendant's general manager
and as being a new car in every respect except that it had been driven a little
over 3000 miles. Mr. Cox testified that, in reliance upon those assurances,
he purchased the automobile.
Immediately thereafter, Mr. Cox experienced major mechanical diffi-
culties. Evidence at trial indicated that contrary to the statements of defend-
ant, the Dodge Monaco had been purchased by the defendant from a used
car dealer the day before it was sold to Mr. Cox. A witness for Mr. Cox
disclosed that defendant knew the car had been wrecked prior to the time it
was purchased from the used car dealer and sold to Mr. Cox.
The court in Independence Dodge gave great deference to the trial court's
opportunity to personally observe the witnesses. It is of major importance
that the court held that the testimony found credible by the trial court estab-
177. 494 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
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lished that the defendant's conduct fell within the prohibition of section
407.020. The crucial language of the court which established the scope and
intendment of section 407.020 is as follows:
The purpose of these statutes is to supplement the definitions of common
law fraud in an attempt to preserve fundamental honesty, fair play and right
dealings in public transactions. In order to give broad scope to the statutory
protection and to prevent ease of evasion because of overly meticulous def-
initions, many of these laws such as the Missouri statute 'do not attempt
to define deceptive practices or fraud, but merely declare unfair or deceptive
acts or practices unlawful . . .' leaving it to the court in each particular
instance to declare whether fair dealing has been violated.7 8
The court of appeals made it clear that the broad sweep of section 407.020
and the legislative mandate found in the Act to protect the Missouri consumer
against unfair practices was to be given liberal scope.
It was now clear that not only could the Attorney General bring a cause
of action on "the relation of" private individuals to enjoin unfair trade
practices, but that the common law requirements and burdens placed upon
a plaintiff alleging fraud were now supplanted. The newly created right was
given shape and definition in Independence Dodge:
Defendant objects to the issuance of an injunction against it on the
ground that there was no showing of a lack of adequate legal remedy or
that irreparable injury was threatened. The basic fallacy in this argument ig
that it approaches the situation as if this were merely an ordinary suit
between private litigants. That is not the situation. This new public right of
action was created for the very reason that private causes of action had
proven largely ineffective to prevent consumer fraud. In actual practice,
experience had shown that individual action by consumers is much too costly
in that the expense of litigation usually outweighs the amount of likely
recovery. Furthermore, the onerous provisions of adhesion contracts make
recovery in this type of case difficult, while at the same time the growing
impersonal character of the marketplace has made retail relationships less
amenable to the tradition of the disciplines of consumer goodwill and the
amenities of mutual acquaintanceship. It is upon these considerations that
legislatures throughout the country, including Missouri, have created this
new remedy and have implemented it by authorizing the issuance of in-
junction where consumer fraud is found. That legislative determination con-
stitutes sufficient authorization without more for the propriety of an injunction
in a case under this statute.7 9
The Merchandising Practices Act was further delineated, defined, and broad-
ened to a considerable extent by State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Marketing Unlim-
ited,180 decided on January 27, 1981, by the Missouri Court of Appeals,
178. Id. at 368 (citation omitted).
179. Id. at 370 (citation omitted).
180. 613 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
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Eastern District. In November 1977, the Attorney General sought an in-
junction, restitution, and the appointment of a receiver against defendant
company and its principles. The Attorney General alleged a violation of
section 407.020 in that defendants entered into various contracts with Mis-
souri citizens promising distributorships and the supplying of goods therefor.
The evidence presented at trial established that defendants took the money
of Missouri consumers, blatantly violated the terms of the contracts, did not
provide the goods to be used in the distributorships, and did not fulfill
numerous other contractual and oral promises. The basic provisions of the
written contracts provided that in return for payment the Missouri consumers
would receive retail outlets, machines, or racks with which to sell candy. The
Missouri consumers also testified that defendants promised to repurchase any
unused inventory or to refund their investment if financial success was not
born out. The trial court ruled in favor of defendants finding that "a breach
of contract is not to be equated with an unlawful act which constitutes a
violation of Chapter 407 RSMo 1969 as amended (Supp. 1975)."'81
The Eastern District Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed the lower
court. In language startling in its sweep, the court clearly embodied in its
opinion the intent of the legislature and the breadth of section 407.020.
Relying on Independence Dodge, the court noted that by the very terms and
language of section 407.020 the elements of common law fraud need not be
proven to establish consumer fraud under the Act.' The court concluded
that because the injunctive relief provided for in section 407.100 is remedial
and not punitive, the Act should be given a liberal construction." 3 In reaching
its decision in Marketing Unlimited, the court compared and contrasted Mis-
souri's Merchandising Practices Act with similar consumer protection laws
found in New Jersey, Delaware and Arizona. 8 4 The court concluded that
consumer protection laws are not only to be given broad scope and liberally
interpreted by not requiring proof of common law fraud, but that the Mer-
chandising Practices Act was to be construed to prevent those representations
and activities which merely have the capacity to mislead. 8 The court ruled
that the capacity to mislead is the prime ingredient of deception and that
intent to deceive is not an essential element of an offense under the Act. 8 6
The administrative subpoena power possessed by the Attorney General,
and embodied in the civil investigative demand provisions of the Merchan-
dising Practices Act, has also been subjected to judicial interpretation.
181. Id. at 444.
182. Id. at 445.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 445-46.
185. Id. at 445.
186. Id. at 445, 447.
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Once again, the seminal case providing judicial guidance is Independence
Dodge. 87 In addition to the discussion in this article regarding that case, the
court also established that the issuance of an investigative demand is not a
prerequisite to the Attorney General filing a lawsuit for injunctive relief
pursuant to section 407.100.18 The court discussed the rationale and policy
reasons for the investigative demand and its use as a tool by the Attorney
General and stated:
The purpose of the Civil Investigative Demand procedure is to provide
a form of pre-trial discovery for the benefit of the Attorney General. A
comparison of the provisions of section 407.040, which creates this new
procedure, with the Federal Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C.A. section
1312, reveals that our new Civil Investigative Demand proceeding is pat-
terned after the parallel provisions of the Federal procedure which is also
entitled 'Civil Investigative Demand'. The new procedure under section
407.040 is also similar to the pre-trial discovery opportunities given to the
Missouri Attorney General in antitrust cases under section 416.300, RSMo
1969, V.A.M.S.
Under neither of those other Federal or Missouri provisions has it ever
been intimated that the pre-trial discovery had to be pursued as a necessary
prerequisite to the filing of a suit for coercive relief. 89
The investigative demand sections were subsequently the subject of further
appellate court review. The Missouri Supreme Court, en banc, had occasion
to rule on the constitutionality of section 407.040, when it decided the case
of Lewandowski v. Danforth,190 on March 14, 1977.
In Lewandowski appellants were the principles of Pen Pals International,
and were the subject of an attorney general's investigative demand. Appel-
lants instituted the lawsuit by filing a petition to set aside the investigative
demand in the Circuit Court of Jackson County. The Missouri Supreme
Court referred favorably to Independence Dodge, and noted the parallel
between Missouri's investigative demand statutes and the Federal Antitrust
Civil Process Act.191 The Missouri Supreme Court then examined sections
407.040 and 407.070 and determined that persons "served with a CID are
fully afforded the protection of procedural due process."'' 9 The court noted
that due process is not a static or rigid concept, and by its very nature "due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable
to every imaginable situation."' 93 The court added that the procedures re-
187. State ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, 494 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973).
188. Id. at 366.
189. Id.
190. 547 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977).
191. 547 S.W.2d at 472.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
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quired in any given factual scenario must begin with a determination of the
precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private
interest that has been affected by governmental action. 194 The court concluded
that the governmental function involved in an investigative demand, where
the person to whom it is directed is suspected of a merchandising practice
violation, is a function of considerable importance to the general public. 195
However, the court further found that the legislature did not bestow unbri-
dled authority upon the Attorney General to investigate suspected violations
of Missouri's consumer protection laws at the expense of any individual
entitlement to procedural due process. 96 The investigative demand statutes
were found constitutional because section 407.040 required reasonable notice
of the conduct under investigation, specified notice of the documents to be
produced, and the opportunity to challenge the investigative demand prior
to responding to it.191 Therefore recipients had their opportunity to be heard
as well as other constitutionally mandated requirements. It is interesting to
note that the Missouri Supreme Court ended its opinion in Lewandowski by
stating that it was premature for appellants to assert that the investigative
demand was inappropriate because it requested trade secrets since such claims
were not ripe until the Attorney General sought to use the alleged trade secret
material in court. 198
Thus, Lewandowski not only affirmed the constitutionality of the in-
vestigative demand statutes, but also reinforced the notion of the important
public function the Attorney General plays when he investigates a suspected
merchandising practices violation. In 1980 the Missouri Supreme Court, en
banc, once again had the opportunity to review the investigative demand
statutes of the Merchandising Practices Act in State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Gold-
berg. 99 In Goldberg, the court referred to the investigative demand sections
of the Act as those which the legislature clearly intended "to aid in the
discovery and prevention of fraudulent and deceptive practices in the adver-
tisement and sale of any merchandise described in section 407.010(4)."2 oo The
Goldberg case had its genesis in an investigative demand issued by the At-
torney General that was directed to Goldberg, to which Goldberg did not
respond. The Attorney General sought to compel Goldberg to answer the
investigative demand by filing a petition in the trial court pursuant to section
407.090. The Missouri Supreme Court noted that section 407.040 did not
apply to criminal proceedings,201 and that the criminal penalties applicable
194. Lewandowski v. Danforth, 547 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Mo. 1977) (en banc),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 547 S.W.2d at 473.
198. Id.
199. 608 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1980) (en banc).
200. Id. at 386.
201. Id. at 387.
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under section 407.080 when an investigative demand is evaded did not apply
to the case before the court because there was no suggestion that Goldberg's
conduct was of the sort specifically condemned in those penal provisions. 202
Thereafter, the court noted a minor difficulty with section 407.090 in that
it required an appeal directly from the circuit court to the supreme court
when a final order was entered requiring compliance with an investigative
demand. 203 The court stated that the Act was not unconstitutional simply
because the appellate procedure designated therein, as it concerned an in-
vestigative demand, had become obsolete by virtue of constitutional change3 °0
Since the substantive provisions of the law were clearly severable from the
challenged procedure for appeal, Goldberg's claim that the investigative de-
mand statutes were unconstitutional was found wanting. 205
The technical conflict between sections 407.040 and 407.050, in that the
former requires that material subject to an investigative demand be made
available "at such reasonable time and place as may be stated in the inves-
tigative demand," '2a 6 and the latter section states that the material requested
"shall be produced during normal business hours at the principal office or
place of business of the person served, or at such other times and places as
may be agreed upon by the person served and the Attorney General," 20 was
an issue the court felt to be of more concern to the legislature. The court
simply noted that regardless of the technical conflict in language between
those sections as to the place where the requested material was to be pro-
duced, any challenge made as to the place of production was to be made
first to a circuit court in a motion to set aside or to modify an investigative
demand. 208 The court further ruled that without such a motion being made,
Goldberg "ha[d] waived such a minor discrepency. ' '2°9 The Goldberg court
put its imprimatur once again upon Independence Dodge by quoting from
it to the effect that the Civil Investigative Demand Procedure is to provide
a form of pretrial discovery for the benefit of the Attorney General.210 Fi-
nally, the supreme court in Goldberg found that the investigative statutes
did not violate any constitutional rights Goldberg may have had pertaining
to unreasonable search and seizure, self-incrimination, due process, or equal
protection. 21' All of those contentions raised by Goldberg were rejected based





206. Id. at 387-88.
207. Id. at 387.




212. Id. at 388-89.
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case before it the only issue was one of a civil remedy for the failure to
comply with an investigative demand. 23 The court ended its opinion by con-
curring with the trial court and ordering that Goldberg comply with the
investigative demand issued by the Attorney General. 2 4 Another section of
the Merchandising Practices Act that has been the subject of litigation is
section 407.030. As previously discussed, that section concerns an enforce-
ment remedy called an assurance of voluntary compliance. The next case
discussed resulted in a ruling that, for all practical purposes, assurances of
voluntary compliance were totally unenforceable. 2
In State of Missouri, ex rel. Danforth v. European Health Spa, Inc.,216
the Attorney General and the health spa entered into an assurance of vol-
untary compliance in 1968 wherein certain alleged advertising practices were
agreed to be ceased. Ten years later, in March 1978, the Attorney General
filed a petition for civil damages pursuant to section 407.110 alleging that
the health spa had committed certain acts in violation of the assurance of
voluntary compliance. After a thorough review of the legislative history of
sections 407.030 and 407.110, the court concluded that the legislature did
not intend to, and did not in fact, provide for civil penalties in the event a
party failed to comply with any provision of an assurance of voluntary
compliance. 2 7 In the absence of penalties for violations of assurances of
voluntary compliance, this remedy became valueless and allocated to a dor-
mant status.
However, as discussed above, the General Assembly effectively re-
sponded to this judicial interpretation in the 1985 amendments to the Mer-
chandising Practices Act. Subsection 2 of section 407.030 (1985) now provides:
Any person who violates the terms of an assurance of voluntary com-
pliance entered into under subsection 1 of this section shall forfeit and pay
to the state a civil penalty of not more than two thousand dollars per
violation. For the purposes of this subsection, the circuit court of a county
approving a voluntary assurance of compliance shall retain jurisdiction, and
the attorney general acting in the name of the state may petition for recovery
of civil penalties under this subsection.218
As a result of this new statutory enactment, the assurance of voluntary
compliance now constitutes an effective and frequently enforced tool of the
Attorney General for violations of the Merchandising Practices Act.
An additional limitation of the Merchandising Practices Act that has
been judicially highlighted concerns the authority of the Attorney General
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. State ex rel. Danforth v. European Health Spa, 611 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980).
216. 611 S.W.2d 259 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
217. Id. at 263-64.
218. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.030(2) (1985).
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to seek injunctive relief for violations of the Act. In State of Missouri ex
rel. Danforth v. W. E. Construction Company,2 9 the Attorney General filed
a petition for injunction under the Act against W. E. Construction Company,
a corporation, and its president and chief stockholder, Floyd Edwin Harris.
Evidence was adduced at trial that defendant Harris promised various pur-
chasers assistance in moving to their new homes, that certain roads would
be dead-end streets, and that if purchasers were dissatisfied, the corporation
would build another home for them; but all the representations were never
fulfilled. The trial court found that these false promises were admissible under
the Act and issued an order enjoining the corporation but denied injunctive
relief against the individual defendant, Floyd Edwin Harris. 220 The Attorney
General appealed the denial of injunctive relief against Harris. The appellate
court affirmed the orders issued by the trial court. 221 The appellate court
noted that the language of section 407.100 was not mandatory and did not
require the court to issue the injunction. 2 The court stated that an injunction
was not a matter of right "but [its] granting rests in the sound discretion of
the court, to be exercised in accordance with well-settled equitable principles
and in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case.' '2
It was of considerable interest that the court stated in W. E. Construction
Co. that "trade regulation acts generally do not make it mandatory for the
court to issue an injunction in every instance where it finds that a defendant
in a proceeding brought thereunder has committed a violation. The issuance
of an injunction in such cases is a matter of discretion. ' ' 224 The appellate
court found that there was an evidentiary basis for the trial court's finding
that Harris made misrepresentations to purchasers.22 However, the appellate
court concluded that regardless of the correctness of the trial court's finding
in regard to Harris, it was within the proper exercise of the trial court's
discretion not to issue an injunction against him "in view of the fact that
he had ceased and desisted from engaging in the construction business, and
presented no prospect of re-entering the field." 26 The appellate court went
on to state that "it is well recognized that rights already lost, and wrongs
already perpetrated, cannot be corrected in such manner. ' ' - 7
Although this decision is not broad sweeping because the appellate court
stressed the discretionary powers of the trial court in issuing injunctions, and
the ad hoc approach utilized, it nonetheless somewhat negatively impacts
219. 552 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
220. Id. at 72-73.
221. Id. at 75.
222. Id. at 73.
223. Id. (citation omitted).
224. Id. at 73-74 (citation omitted).
225. Id. at 74.
226. Id.
227. Id. (citation omitted).
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upon the Merchandising Practices Act. The mere cessation by a violator of
the Act of the unlawful activities should not form the basis for the denial
of an injunction. Absent a specific injunctive court order, and the significant
penalties attached thereto for violation of the order, there is nothing to legally
prevent the violator from resuming the unlawful activities once the "dust
has settled." This problem should be addressed by a future amendment to
the Merchandising Practices Act.
Some additional cases have arisen collateral to the Merchandising Prac-
tices Act that have served to hinder enforcement of the important consumer
restitution aspect of the Act. These cases concern the federal Bankruptcy
Code and the negative effect these laws can have on consumers who have
been subjected to fraud. The first hinderance in enforcing the Act during a
pending bankruptcy is set forth in the Bankruptcy Code itself. This concerns
the "automatic stay provisions" of the code that block or halt collateral
non-bankruptcy litigation unless an exemption from those provisions can be
shown. 228 A second obstacle that has been encountered by the Attorney Gen-
eral in seeking to protect defrauded consumers in the face of pending bank-
ruptcy concerns the requisite "creditor" status that must exist before a claim
for restitution can be filed with the bankruptcy court.
In State of Missouri ex reL Ashcroft v. Cannon ,229 the Missouri Attorney
General filed an action with the St. Louis County Circuit Court alleging
violations of the Merchandising Practices Act based upon misrepresentations
of the defendants regarding employment contracts. Subsequent to the filing
of the lawsuit, and just several days before trial was to commence, defendant
Cannon filed for personal and corporate bankruptcy. During subsequent
negotiations between the Attorney General and defendant Cannon, a consent
injunction was agreed upon and approved by the St. Louis County Circuit
Court. According to the terms of the court order, the defendant was pro-
hibited from the unlawful conduct and required to pay restitution to eight
victims named in the order. The Attorney General then filed the order with
the bankruptcy court and petitioned the court not to discharge the eight
victims in bankruptcy. The ultimate ruling of the bankruptcy court was that
the Attorney General lacked standing to make this claim since he was not a
"creditor" under the terms of the Bankruptcy Code.230 As discussed above,
the legislature reacted to this decision by amending section 407.100 in 1985
to allow the Attorney General to seek, and the circuit court to grant, resti-
tution "payable to the state" to be distributed to the aggrieved consumer.23'
The effective date of this new law was May 31, 1985. Thus the state, through
228. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
229. 31 Bankr. 823 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd, 36 Bankr. 450 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd,
741 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1984).
230. Id. at 826-27.
231. Mo. REv. STAT. § 407.100(4) (1985).
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the Attorney General, could attack dischargeability in bankruptcy since the
"creditor status" has been legislatively conferred. A short time after Cannon,
the Attorney General filed a claim in another bankruptcy proceeding alleging
nondischargeability on another injunction and restitution order he had ob-
tained. This case is entitled In re Danzig.232 In the injunction obtained by
the Attorney General in In re Danzig, the restitution had been ordered by
the court to be paid to the state pursuant to the new law, subsection 4 of
section 407.100. Since the bankruptcy court found that the alleged fraud in
the state action occurred before the effective date of the new law, the court
denied the Attorney General's claim and ruled that the new law was to have
prospective application only. 233 A final obstacle is encountered by the At-
torney General when he seeks to protect victims of consumer fraud from
discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding. That obstacle concerns the different
burdens of proof required under the Bankruptcy Code and the Merchandising
Practices Act. The Bankruptcy Code provides that "money, property or
services" obtained from a consumer creditor based upon "false pretenses, a
false representation, or actual fraud" are not dischargeable in bankruptcyY 4
Federal case law interpreting this section uniformly holds the consumer cred-
itor must establish that the false statement was intentional and he relied
thereon to his monetary detriment. 235 However, the burden to establish fraud
under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act and other states' consumer
protection laws is much less, and intent to defraud and consumer reliance
are not required. 6 This dissimilarity of the burden of proof required under
federal and state law may result in the necessity of conducting a second trial
in the bankruptcy court, utilizing the greater burden of proof even though a
thorough and favorable state proceeding has already been concluded with
consumer restitution being ordered. 237 This obviously is a waste of resources
and forestalls relief for the victimized consumer.
While the bankruptcy courts and code serve a necessary function, they
are subject to abuse by unscrupulous con men discharging consumers from
whom they stole money. The passage of proposed federal legislation would
have favorably resolved this problem for the consumer. 23 The pertinent lan-
guage of the senate bill stated:
232. In re Danzig, No. 86-1568C(1) (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1986).
233. Id. at.
234. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1978).
235. E.g., In re Collins (Jack Master, Inc. v. Collins), 28 Bankr. 244, 246-48
(W.D. Okla. 1983).
236. State ex rel. Ashcroft v. Marketing Unlimited of America, 613 S.W.2d
440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Stephenson v. Capano Dev., 462 A.2d 1069 (Del. 1983);
People ex rel. Hartigan v. Stianos, 131 Ill. App. 3d 575, 475 N.E.2d 1024 (1985);
Jeffco Fibres v. Dario Diesel Service, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1029, 433 N.E.2d 918 (1982);
Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. 1980).
237. Schwartz v. Renville Farmers Co-op Credit Union, 44 Bankr. 266 (D.
Minn. 1984).
238. S. 2531, 99th Cong. (1986).
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(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title [11
USCS § 724, 1141, or 1328(b)] does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt-
(10) to the extent that such debt arises from a judgment or consent
decree entered in a court of record existing at the time offiling or thereafter
rendered, or from a claim requiring the debtor to make restitution to, for
the benefit of, or for distribution by a governmental entity as a result of a
violation of state law by the debtors; .. 29
If this legislation had been passed the roadblock encountered by the Missouri
Attorney General in Connor and Danzig in his effort to protect consumers
would have been effectively removed. The consent injunctions and judgments
he obtains under the Merchandising Practices Act would have become non-
dischargeable in bankruptcy and thus the last main loophole to meaningful
consumer protection would have been closed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The year 1967 heralded in the first comprehensive "consumer protec-
tion" statute, called the "Merchandising Practices Act," to afford a level
of economic protection for Missouri consumers in the marketplace. In a
sense, the 1967 Act was simplistic and "under-gunned." The initial Act only
covered the advertisement and sale of "merchandise" and the proscribed
unlawful conduct, i.e. misrepresentations, fraud, deception, false promise,
etc., was punishable solely by civil governmental action. With the subsequent
legislative amendments and developmental case law, however, the Act evolved
into one of the most far reaching, all encompassing, consumer protection
laws in the nation.
By amendment in 1973, the Merchandising Practices Act was expanded
to provide for private civil litigation. Consumers who were defrauded in the
marketplace could seek private recourse for out-of-pocket losses and attor-
ney's fees without any longer being required to meet the difficult and complex
common law fraud standard. Additionally, 1973 saw the first "mini-act"
incorporated within the Merchandising Practices Act. This was the "Odom-
eter Fraud Act" directed at combatting the multi-million dollar intentional
fraud of odometer tampering.
In appellate decisions that arose under the Merchandising Practices Act,
it became clear that Missouri courts were strongly disposed to liberally in-
terpreting the various provisions of the Act to effectuate its consumer pro-
tection philosophy. It was soon made clear by the courts that actions brought
under the Merchandising Practices Act were a distinct alternative to common
law fraud cases. Not only were reliance and detrimental damages not required
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anyone was actually deceived. All that was needed for actionable conduct
under the Act was that the conduct had a capacity to deceive. The actor's
intent in regard to the unlawful conduct was likewise deemed irrelevant by
the courts.
Augmenting this decisional law, the legislature in 1985, and again in
1986, enacted strong new enforcement provisions to the Act and created new
laws within the Act, all directed at increasing economic protection for the
public.
The "Time-Share Act" was created in 1985 to provide effective protec-
tion to consumers in a new industry that had a disproportionate share of
dissatisfied customers. By statutory enactment, the legislature conferred upon
the Attorney General the right to review the promotional literature of these
businesses prior to its dissemination to assure that the literature complied
with the spirit of the Merchandising Practices Act. Moreover, the legislature
enacted a statute that provides that purchasers of time-shares were entitled
to cancel the contract and receive a return of their money within five days
of the purchase. The legislature in 1985 also created strong criminal penalties
for intentional violation of the "anti-fraud" provisions of the Act. Such
commissions of the enumerated "unlawful practices" are now deemed to be
class D felonies.
In 1986, the legislature vested within the Attorney General massive new
enforcement devices. First, he was granted "original concurrent jurisdiction"
with local prosecutors to criminally prosecute, as class D felonies, intentional
violations of the Act. Secondly, he was statutorily conferred authority to
issue, extrajudicially, cease and desist orders against such violators. Finally,
he was vested with rulemaking authority to assist in the "administration and
enforcement" of the Act.
In addition to the creation of these broad new enforcement powers, in
1986 the legislature enacted a new "mini-act" to regulate charitable solici-
tations and provide for effective enforcement techniques and deterrents for
charitable fraud. The "Charitable Organizations and Solicitations Laws," as
the sections comprising this "mini-act" are known, was drafted so as not to
burden or hinder the collection efforts of bona fide charities, while at the
same time providing the necessary legal means to detect and prosecute "char-
itable fraud." Missouri's Merchandising Practices Act, as it now exists, con-
stitutes one of the most comprehensive "consumer protection" statutes in
the United States. The scope of the basic Act is sufficiently broad to encom-
pass and regulate the most novel schemes springing from the ever fertile
minds of con men, while the "mini-acts" provide effective regulation in
specialized areas such as "time-shares" and "charitable fraud" with their
unique problems. The Act now contains a broad range of remedies and
enforcement methods including cease and desist orders, civil penalties and
injunctions, and criminal penalties for intentional violations.
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